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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON FISCAL COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY
BY
YONGZHENG LIU
August 2013
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to fiscal
competition. The first essay investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for public
input competition and compares it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Given two asymmetric regions, I show that under the Nash equilibrium, the more
productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region
attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two
equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first mover advantage under the
Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other
sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is
due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged,
depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process.
This second essay examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the
disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a
decentralized economy. I build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in
initial endowments try to attract capital by competing public input that enhances
the productivity of capital; meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by
the central government to reduce regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key
prediction, borne out in data from the German equalization system, is that while
competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it
weakens discipline in the poorly endowed regions. However, a conventional
xi
equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can be effective in
correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across
competing regions.
This third essay aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent and possible
channels of tax competition among provincial governments in China. Using a panel
of provincial level data for 1993-2007, I find strong evidence of strategic tax
interaction among provincial governments. Tax policy is approximated by average
effective tax rates on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives
available to foreign investors. In line with the predictions of the theoretical tax
competition literature, I also highlight the impact of each province’s characteristics
(including its size and level of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its
neighbors. Finally, I explicitly identify the establishment of development zones as an
important conduit for tax competition among provinces.
xii
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal competition is an important topic in the theory and practice of fiscal
federalism, and one that has been a very active area of research for the past twenty
years or so. In what is by now the “benchmark conclusion” in this literature,
competition among jurisdictions to attract mobile tax bases leads to inefficiently low
tax rates (dubbed “race to the bottom”), and/or a high level of investment in public
input that enhances capital productivity.
However, recent studies revealed that even in the European Union (EU) where
financial integration has created an environment of near-perfect capital mobility
across member countries, the average effective tax rates on capital remain high in
some member states. The “race to the bottom” does not seem to take place as a
consequence of fiscal competition in this region. Additionally, the symmetric
implication in the standard fiscal competition theory for all the competing units to
take the same actions has also hidden the potential for intergovernmental conflict.
It also fails to explain the actual asymmetric policy responses of governments, which
are observed in many regions of the world. A compelling example of this is the high
variation of tax and expenditure policies in EU member countries. On the other
hand, while the literature has provided rich evidence for the presence of fiscal
competition among sub-national governments in the United States and other
developed countries, there is surprisingly less evidence from the developing
countries. Therefore, a better understanding of the outcomes of fiscal competition
1
requires further endeavors in the relevant aspects that would complement the
current literature.
This dissertation comprises three essays that attempt to make separate
contributions in that direction, both theoretically and empirically. Each of them
adds to the literature by improving the current understandings of the outcomes of
fiscal competition in certain aspect. Particularly, the first essay (Chapter II)
examines the Stackelberg equilibrium for competition through public input and
compares it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. For simplicity and
tractability, the model assumes: (i) that regions that are heterogeneous in
productivity compete for mobile capital by providing a productivity-enhancing
public input; and (ii) that the capital tax rate is coordinated by the central
government and so it is no longer a policy instrument for competition. These two
assumptions allow the advantage of focusing exclusively on the strategic interactions
for public input among regions, which simplifies the comparison between the two
equilibria. I show that under the Nash equilibrium, the more productive region
tends to select a higher level of public input, which results in this region attracting
more capital than the less productive region—a result that echoed the finding in
some previous work. A further comparison of the Stackelberg equilibrium and Nash
equilibrium suggests an asymmetric outcome for the leader region and the follower
region: while the leader region sets a higher level of public input under the former
game setting than the latter, the follower region does the opposite. A key policy
message that follows from these findings is that the competing disadvantage of the
less productive region can be mitigated (enlarged) when we allow regions to behave
in a Stackelberg fashion and let the less productive region (the more productive
region) to be the leader in the competition game.
The second essay (Chapter III) investigates the potential role of an equalization
transfer system in correcting the distortion of competition for capital among
2
heterogeneous regions in initial endowments. This distortion has been particularly
claimed by Cai and Treisman (2005) and echoed in the first essay, arguing that
competition among these heterogeneous regions leads to a “one-sided” disciplining
effect on regional governments’ expenditure policies: only well-endowed regions end
up with more public input, while poorly-endowed counterparts do the opposite. I
add a conventional equalization system to a similar model setup as in the first essay
and show how this “one-sided” disciplining effect can be corrected by the system
with desired parameter settings. In particular, I show that the system of
equalization imposes an implicit tax on a region’s revenue that is generated by its
public input policy. Thus, if the equalization scheme initially confronts
well-endowed regions with a higher marginal tax rate on any additional revenues
produced by investment in public input relative to initially poorly endowed regions,
then well-endowed regions have a relatively lower incentive to expand the tax base
by choosing higher levels of public input. As a consequence, the original divergent
expenditure policies on public input between poorly and well-endowed regions,
driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments, will be mitigated by the
asymmetric incentives of the two types of regions in response to the equalization
transfer system.
After developing the model, I test it empirically with data from Germany. The
selection of Germany is due to the following three reasons. First, tax legislation is
highly centralized at the federal level in Germany. Tax rates are, therefore, uniform
across states, which fits well with the model assumption that “tax rates are fixed at
the federal level”. Second, the full implementation of the complex equalization
system, which combines both “horizontal” redistribution of tax revenues between
rich and poor states and “vertical” transfers from the federal government, implies
varied extents of equalization among states with different fiscal capacities—a feature
that is important for the empirical identification. Third, the recent reunification of
3
East and West Germany provides a “natural” classification of the poorly endowed
and well-endowed regions, which is essential to empirically test the asymmetric
policy responses of initially heterogeneous regions as a result of competition for
capital.
Using a panel dataset of German states covering the period between 1995-2007,
the estimation results from dynamic spatial lag models provide strong evidence
supporting the theoretical predictions. It confirms the hypothesis that initially
well-endowed states (i.e., West German states) tend to spend a higher proportion on
public input than their poorly endowed counterparts (i.e., East German states).
Further, my estimation identifying the role of the equalization system suggests a
negative impact of a state’s own marginal tax rate of equalization and a positive
impact of the competing states’ marginal tax rate of equalization, on the state’s
expenditure on public input. This result validates the theoretical implication that
the equalization system can be used as a mechanism to correct the “one-sided”
disciplining effect driven by competition among heterogeneous regions.
The third essay (Chapter IV) explores the issue of tax competition in the world’s
largest developing country—China. The objective of this essay is to provide
empirical evidence on the extent of tax competition among provincial governments
in China, and to examine the possible channels through which the competition is
conducted. To proceed, I first calculate for each province the average effective tax
rate (AETR) on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available
to foreign investors for the period 1993-2007 covering 30 provinces. I then employ
dynamic spatial lag models to identify the competing pattern among the provinces.
The estimation results provide strong evidence in support of the existence of
positively strategic tax interactions among provincial governments in China. In line
with the theoretical hypotheses, the results also highlight the economic significance
of a province’ spatial characteristics in determining its choice of AETR. In
4
particular, provinces with a higher level of industrialization tend to select a higher
level of tax rate than provinces with a lower level of industrialization. Although, in
theory, larger provinces are predicted to choose higher tax rates, my results only
provide week support for this argument.
Another important contribution of this essay is that I shed some light on the
possible channels through which the competition is actually conduced in the
Chinese context where there is a highly centralized tax system. My identification on
this issue lies on the observation of the booming trend in development zones that
took place contemporaneously with China’s rapid economic growth. Given the
endorsed favorable tax policies and the large local administrative discretion granted
by the central government to the development zones, I explore the establishment of
development zones as a conduit for provincial tax competition. My estimation
results from the structural models confirm this conjecture to the extent that the
introduction of development zones does lead to significant reduction of the AETR,
which in turn successfully attract more foreign investment.
5
Chapter II
PUBLIC INPUT COMPETITION UNDER STACKELBERG
EQUILIBRIUM
II.1 Introduction
The past several decades have witnessed a growing interest in the study of how
competition for capital influences governments’ choices of fiscal policies. The
standard argument, which originates in the fundamental work of Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), has been that competition through taxation
leads to inefficiently low tax rates. On the contrary, if competition is conducted
through the use of public input that enhances the productivity of private capital, an
overemphasis on that policy is commonly expected to emerge (Keen and Marchand,
1997; Bayindir-Upmann, 1998; Bucovetsky, 2005).1 Despite providing valuable
insights into the nature of competition among governments, these results have been
generally obtained under a non-cooperative game framework in which competing
units move simultaneously. However, as challenged by Wang (1999) and Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010), the relevance of the non-cooperative hypothesis for the study
of fiscal competition has not yet been established in reality.2 Relaxing this
1Numerous subsequent works have extended and refined these arguments in a variety of directions.
See Dembour (2008) for a survey of literature on competitive location policies. For surveys of the
tax competition literature in general, see Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004).
2Due to the complexity of the strategic interaction of competing units, it has indeed never been
clarified in the literature which game setting, either simultaneous or sequential, is a better approx-
imation of reality. In some cases, it is conceivable that the smaller regions make their strategic
responses after they observe the actions chosen by the larger regions. In other cases, the difference
between core versus periphery regions may also translate into strategic asymmetries. The empirical
6
hypothesis to investigate a scenario in which competition is conducted in a
sequential game framework, both studies show that the downward pressure on tax
rates is indeed less strong than predicted in the standard tax competition
analysis—in a large part that is due to the property of strategic complementarity of
tax rates across the competing units. More specifically, when the competing units
follow a sequence of moves in setting their tax rates, the second moving region (the
“Stackelberg follower”) will increase its tax rate if it observes a higher level of tax
rate chosen by the first moving region (the “Stackelberg leader”); the leader
anticipates this and consequently increases its tax rate. As a result, the selected tax
rates in both regions in the Stackelberg equilibrium are higher than that in the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
This paper adds to this literature by asking whether the different outcomes
implied by the varied game settings for tax rate setting can be generalized to the
case of competition through public input. More specifically, I investigate the
Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compare it with the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. For simplicity and tractability, my model
assumes: (i) that regions that are heterogeneous in productivity compete for mobile
capital by providing a productivity-enhancing public input; and (ii) that the capital
tax rate is coordinated by the social planner and so it is no longer a policy
instrument for competition. These two assumptions, which are similar to that of
Cai and Treisman (2005), presents the advantage of focusing exclusively on the
strategic interactions for public input among regions and enables us to simplify the
comparison between the two equilibria. Given that the underlying mechanisms
through which tax rates and public inputs are utilized to attract capital are
different, my results reveal somewhat non-comparable outcomes between these two
literature, on the other hand, does provide some evidence on the presence of Stackelberg-type lead-
ers in tax competition across regions and countries (e.g., Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002; de Mello,
2008).
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tools of competition. In particular, I show that the public input is a strategic
substitute among the competing units in the public input competition model—a
feature that differs from the case of tax competition, where tax rates are strategic
complements. A further comparison of the Stackelberg equilibrium and Nash
equilibrium of public input competition highlights the importance of differentiating
the leader region and the follower region, which again differs from the case of tax
competition in suggesting a consistent downward selection of tax rates in both types
of region under Stackelberg equilibrium.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II.2 presents the basic
model. Section II.3 proceeds with the equilibrium analysis in both game settings
and compares the equilibrium outcomes. Section II.4 concludes.
II.2 The Model
Consider an economy that consists of two regions, i = 1, 2. In each region, a
numeraire output is produced under perfect competition, and this output can be
used either for private consumption or government consumption. The production
function in each region is given by Fi(Li, Ki, Ii), where Ki is the amount of perfectly
mobile capital, Ii is the amount of public input provided by the regional government
that enhances the productivity of domestic capital,4 and Li is the amount of a fixed
production factor such as land or labor. For analytical convenience the fixed factor
is normalized to unity and the production function can be rewritten as Fi(Ki, Ii),
which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable and concave in the level of
capital Ki; i.e.,
∂Fi
∂Ki
> 0 > ∂
2Fi
∂K2i
. Domestic capital and public input are complements,
so an increased provision of public input increases the marginal productivity of
3See Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) for the comparison of the Stackelberg equilibrium and
Nash equilibrium for competition through tax rates.
4Although the magnitude of the output elasticity of public input is still under debate, the lit-
erature has reached a broad consensus on the argument that public input is truly productivity-
enhancing; see Duarte Bom and Ligthart (2008), Ligthart and Martin-Suarez (2011) for a quantita-
tive review of the literature on the productivity of public input.
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capital, i.e., ∂
2Fi
∂Ki∂Ii
> 0. The cost of public input provision is given by the convex
function Ci(Ii), which, for analytical tractability, is assumed to be quadratic:
Ci(Ii) =
I2i
2
.
In each region, public input is financed by a source-based specific tax on capital
t, which is coordinated by the social planner and therefore cannot be a policy
instrument for the regions. By assuming this I am able to focus exclusively on the
nature of public input competition and its impact on public input provision. Private
capital is perfectly mobile and the total fixed stock of private capital in the economy
is assumed equal to K¯; the market clearing conditions imply that the allocation of
capital across the regions equates its net return in the two regions; that is


∂F1
∂K1
− t = ∂F2
∂K2
− t
K1 +K2 = K¯
(1)
where the net return of capital is assumed to be positive in order to ensure a
non-zero allocation of capital in each region, i.e. ∂Fi
∂Ki
− t > 0. To complete the
model, I assume that the objective of each region is to maximize the sum of the
fixed factor income and capital tax revenue, net of the investment costs5
Wi(Ii, Ij) = Fi(Ki, Ii)−Ki
∂Fi
∂Ki
+ tKi − Ci(Ii), j 6= i (2)
In the model, the two regions are assumed to be asymmetric with respect to
their initial productivity which, however, can be mitigated and possibly eliminated
by the regions’ choices of public input. More precisely, following Bucovetsky (1991),
Grazzini and Van Ypersele (2003) and Hindriks et al. (2008), I assume a quadratic
specification of the production function, which is well behaved over its increasing
5I assume there is no domestic ownership of capital. This assumption, which is consistent with
Wildasin (1988), has been used by Hauptmeier et al. (2008), Hindriks et al. (2008), Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010). As argued by Laussel and Le Breton (1998), this assumption can be justified
as a partial equilibrium reflecting the high concentration of countries’ capital distribution.
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range and allows us to introduce several simplifications.6 Specifically, the
production functions are given by


F1(K1, I1) = (a+ δ + I1)K1 −
b
2
K21
F2(K2, I2) = (a− δ + I2)K2 −
b
2
K22
(3)
where b > 1 is the rate of decline of the marginal product of capital with the
amount of capital invested in the region; technology parameter a is assumed to be
sufficient large relative to b, which ensures a positive level of production and the
standard properties of the production function; and the parameter δ > 0 captures
the degree of production asymmetry across regions, with region 1 assumed to have a
superior production technology than region 2.
From equations (1) and (3), I immediately get that


K1 =
I1−I2
2b
+ K¯
2
+ δ
b
K2 =
I2−I1
2b
+ K¯
2
− δ
b
(4)
Therefore, the stock of capital in each region is increasing in its own public input
provision and decreasing in the public input provision of the other region. In
particular, given equal provision of public input, i.e. I1 = I2, region 1 will attract
more capital than its counterpart.
II.3 Nash Equilibrium vs. Stackelberg Equilibrium
In this section I examine the regions’ equilibrium choices, depending on the
sequence of government actions. I first analyze the Nash equilibrium where both
regions simultaneously decide how much public input to provide. Then I derive the
Stackelberg equilibrium by setting one region (the leader) to make the provision
6In my simple context, there is little to be gained from using a more general production function
form.
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decision before the other (the follower) does. Finally, a comparison of the two
equilibria follows.
II.3.1 Nash Equilibrium
In this case, each region chooses its own public input level independently. Given Ij,
the problem of region i is to choose Ii in order to maximize its welfare function (2).
The FOC yields
∂Wi
∂Ii
=
∂Fi
∂Ii
+ (
∂2Fj
∂K2j
Ki + t)
∂Ki
∂Ii
−
∂Ci
∂Ii
= 0, j 6= i (5)
With production functions (3), it is straightforward to show that the Nash
equilibrium (IN1 , I
N
2 ) is jointly determined by


K1
2
− I1 +
t
2b
= 0
K2
2
− I2 +
t
2b
= 0
(6)
In addition, the second order condition is satisfied at (IN1 , I
N
2 ), i.e.
−1 < ∂
2Wi
∂I2i
= 1
4b
− 1 < 0, which guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium.7 Combining equations (4) and (6) to solve the equilibrium, I
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The Nash equilibrium requires a higher level of public input and
capital in the more productive region:
I1 =
K¯
4
+ t
2b
+ δ
2b−1
> I2 =
K¯
4
+ t
2b
− δ
2b−1
;K1 =
K¯
2
+ 2δ
2b−1
> K2 =
K¯
2
− 2δ
2b−1
The explanation is simple. Since the capital tax rate is fixed across regions, the
Nash equilibrium requires allocating capital so as to equate the marginal product of
capital across regions. Due to the heterogeneity of regional productivity and given
other things being equal, the marginal product of capital is higher in the more
7Note that it is assumed that b > 1.
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productive region (i.e. region 1). Then the decline of marginal product of capital
requires allocating more capital to the more productive region. Furthermore, the
equilibrium level of investment in public input is determined by the equivalence
between its marginal revenue and its marginal cost. Since the more productive
region receives more capital, it also exhibits higher marginal value of investment,
and thus also undertakes higher public input investment.
II.3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium
Let us consider the equilibrium under the Stackelberg game. Assuming that region i
is the leader in the game, and region j is the follower, I solve this game backwards.
Given the leader’s choice Ii, the maximization problem of the follower j is similar to
the case of a non-cooperative game, the usual FOC of the follower obtains
Kj
2
− Ij(Ii) +
t
2b
= 0 (7)
where Ij(Ii) is the best response function of the follower with respect to the choice
of the leader.
Now given the follower’s best response function Ij(Ii), the leader incorporates
this reaction function into its maximization problem, and the corresponding FOC
after simplification is given by
Ki
2
− Ii +
t
2b
− (
Ki
2
+
t
2b
)
∂Ij
∂Ii
= 0 (8)
Since the derivation of
∂Wj
∂Ij
with respect to Ii and Ij yields
∂2Wj
∂Ij∂Ii
= − 1
4b
and
∂2Wj
∂I2j
= 1
4b
− 1, respectively, applying the Envelop Theorem to equation (7) I obtain
∂Ij
∂Ii
= −
∂2Wj
∂Ij∂Ii
∂2Wj
∂I2j
=
1
1− 4b
< 0 (9)
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With (9), equation (8) can be further simplified to
2b
4b− 1
Ki − Ii +
2t
4b− 1
= 0 (10)
The Stackelberg equilibrium of public input (ILi , I
F
j ) is therefore jointly
determined by equations (7) and (10). Meanwhile, equation (9) implies the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Public input performs as a strategic substitute.
This is so because when region i increases its level of public input, it increases
the competitive pressure on region j as this decision increases the incentive of
capital to relocate from j to i. The marginal utility derived from an increase of
public input set by region j is decreasing since it generates less revenues than the
additional costs for providing it. Therefore, the optimal response for region j is to
reduce its own level of public input. Mathematically, this is reflected by the negative
sign of the second order cross-derivative, i.e.
∂2Wj
∂Ij∂Ii
= − 1
4b
< 0, which implies that
when region i increases its provision of public input, it is optimal for region j to
decrease its provision of public input in order to increase its overall welfare.
II.3.3 Comparison of the Two Equilibria
In this subsection, I compare the Stackelberg equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium
and summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The follower region selects a lower level of public input in the
Stackelberg equilibrium than what this region would select in the Nash equilibrium,
while the leader region does the opposite: IFj < I
N
j ; I
L
i > I
N
i .
Proof. From the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium, I have
Wi(I
L
i , I
F
j (I
L
i )) = Max
Ii
(Ii, I
F
j (Ii)) > Wi(I
N
i , I
F
j (I
N
i )) = Wi(I
N
i , I
N
j ) (11)
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since ∂Wi
∂Ij
= −Ki
2
− t
2b
< 0, if inequality IFj (I
L
i ) > I
N
j holds, then I get
Wi(I
N
i , I
N
j ) = Max
Ii
Wi(Ii, I
N
j ) > Wi(I
L
i , I
N
j ) > Wi(I
L
i , I
F
j ) (12)
Obviously, inequality (12) contradicts to (11). That means IFj (I
L
i ) > I
N
j cannot
hold, and thus I have IFj < I
N
j .
Given that IFj < I
N
j and Lemma 1 (i.e.
∂Ij
∂Ii
< 0), the comparison of the two
equilibria (INi , I
N
j ) and (I
L
i , I
F
j ) immediately concludes with I
L
i > I
N
i . 
Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. In the Nash framework, each
region chooses its level of public input independently, and tends to ignore the
negative externality that it would cause on the tax base of the other region when it
raises its public input. Thus, the Nash provision of public input in each region is
determined by maximizing its own welfare without considering the other region’s
action. In contrast, under the Stackelberg framework, the follower will reduce its
public input if it observes a higher public input level chosen by the leader; the
leader anticipates this and consequently increases its own public input. As a result,
the leader’s provision of public input in the Stackelberg equilibrium is higher than
in the Nash equilibrium; while at the same time the follower selects a level of public
input in the Stackelberg equilibrium that is lower than the level selected in the Nash
equilibrium.
II.3.4 Policy Implications
Proposition 1 highlights an important result obtained by Cai and Treisman (2005).
Due to the heterogeneity of regional productivity, competition for capital leads to
an asymmetric outcome with the more productive region spending more on public
input and attracting more capital than the less productive region. Consequently,
any existing regional disparity is anticipated to get larger in a decentralized
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economy with heterogeneous competing regions. If the continued disadvantage in
attracting capital is deemed undesirable in the less productive region, there is a
need to consider some policies through which this situation can be mitigated or even
reversed. In this regard, Proposition 2 suggests a possible solution. The less
productive region may take advantage by trying to become the first mover in the
public input competition, and so utilizing the first-mover advantage to offset some
of the competitive disadvantage that is generated by the preexisting heterogeneity
of regional productivity.
In order to illustrate this point more vividly, I conduct some numerical
simulations, based on the following settings. The stock of total capital is fixed at
100, the technology parameter a is set at 50, the decline rate of marginal product of
capital b is set at 2, and the capital tax rate t is set at 20%. Then, the degree of
production asymmetry across regions δ is increased in steps from 1 up to 10, and
the two equilibria are computed for each case. The results are reported in Table 1.
As characterized in Proposition 1, Table 1 shows that under the Nash equilibrium,
an increase in the degree of production asymmetry leads to an increase in the gap of
investment in public input and capital allocation between regions 1 and 2. Turning
to the Stackelberg equilibrium, for whichever a region is assumed to be the leader in
the competition, its resulting selection of public input and capital received are
always higher than the corresponding levels under the Nash equilibrium, which
reflects the outcomes summarized in Proposition 2. In support of the above policy
suggestion, when region 2 is the leader, and the degree of production asymmetry is
relatively low, i.e. δ = 1, the competing disadvantage of region 2 in a
non-cooperative competition framework is completely reversed; while in other cases
with larger degrees of production asymmetry, the gap between regions 1 and 2’s
choices of public input and capital received is mitigated. Nevertheless, it should also
be noted that if the opposite is observed (i.e. region 1 is the leader), then the effect
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of the heterogeneity of regional productivity will be strengthened, which eventually
leads to an even larger regional gap in terms of the regions’ choices of public input
and capital received.
Table 1: Simulation Results
δ = 1 δ = 5 δ = 10
I1 I2 K1 K2 I1 I2 K1 K2 I1 I2 K1 K2
Nash 25.38 24.71 50.67 49.33 26.72 23.38 53.33 46.67 28.33 21.72 56.67 43.33
Stackelberg
Region 2 as leader 24.78 28.94 49.46 50.54 26.15 27.38 52.19 47.81 27.85 25.42 55.61 44.39
Region 1 as leader 29.72 24.10 51.91 48.09 31.28 22.74 54.64 45.36 33.23 21.02 58.05 41.95
Source: Authors’ calculation.
II.4 Concluding Remarks
Inspired by some recent work that revisited tax rate competition under a
Stackelberg game framework, this paper extends the analysis to the case of
competition through public input. Given two asymmetric regions, I show that
public input is a strategic substitute among the competing regions in the public
input competition model. A further comparison of the Stackelberg equilibrium and
Nash equilibrium suggests an asymmetric outcome for the leader region and the
follower region: while the leader region sets a higher level of public input under the
former game setting than the latter, the follower region does the opposite. In
addition, under a non-cooperative game framework, I echoed an important result
found in some previous studies—the more productive region tends to select a higher
level of public input, which results in attracting more capital than the less
productive region. A key policy message that follows from my findings is that the
competing disadvantage of the less productive region can be mitigated (enlarged)
when I allow regions to behave in a Stackelberg fashion and let the less productive
region (the more productive region) to be the leader in the competition game.
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Chapter III
DOES COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL DISCIPLINE
GOVERNMENTS? THE ROLE OF FISCAL EQUALIZATION
III.1 Introduction
Competition for capital is known to have important disciplining effect on
governments’ expenditure behavior. This is so because the fear of capital outflows
motivates governments to invest more in public input, such as infrastructure that
enhances the productivity of capital, while spending less on non-productive public
consumption (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998; Schulze and
Ursprung, 1999; Srensen, 2004; Egger and Falkinger, 2006).8 The standard model in
the fiscal competition literature relies on the assumption of homogeneous competing
regions. Most authors agree on a symmetric equilibrium in which regions converge
to the same policies; thus, competition for capital implies a uniform disciplining
effect on all regions.9 Cai and Treisman (2005, henceforth C&T) question the
validity of this homogeneity assumption and argue that competition for capital in a
decentralized economy with heterogeneous regions in initial endowments leads to a
“one-sided” disciplining effect. That is, only well-endowed regions end up with more
8Whether this disciplining effect of competition for capital is harmful or beneficial is still under
debate. Opponents argue that the disciplining effect is gained at the expense of social welfare and
environmental standards (Cumberland, 1981; Rom et al., 1998; Wilson, 1999; Keen and Kotsogiannis,
2004).
9See Dembour (2008) for a survey of literature on competitive location policies. For surveys of
the tax competition literature in general, see Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004).
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public input; poorly-endowed regions, in anticipation of losing the game, will simply
give up on competition and turn to more non-productive public consumption.10
Despite a more reality-relevant model, C&T’s analysis is restricted to the
situation in which decentralization is implemented without any intervention from
the central government. As a stylized feature of many decentralized economies,
however, a system of fiscal equalization similar to those existing in many countries,
such as Canada, Germany or Switzerland, is observed and is deemed to be a key
policy instrument in the hands of the central government for tackling existing
disparities among poorly- and well-endowed regions. In this paper, I extend the
basic model of C&T to include a common form of equalization transfers that
distributes funds to regions on the basis of the representative tax system (RTS)
methodology,11 show that the system of equalization sets disincentives for regional
governments to raise investment in public input, and argue that this finding has
important implications for correcting the above “one-sided” disciplining effect
within the equalization system.
After developing the model, I test it empirically with data from Germany for the
following three reasons. First, tax legislation is highly centralized at the federal level
in Germany. Tax rates are, therefore, uniform across states (La¨nder), which fits well
with the model assumption that “tax rates are fixed at the federal level”.12 Second,
10This observation has strong policy implications for the current ongoing decentralization process
in many countries in which asymmetries in natural resources, human capital, or infrastructure are
quite common across different regions. Decentralization reforms would therefore give rise to diver-
gent expenditure policies by regional governments in these countries; with initially better endowed
regions emphasizing more productive expenditure policies while initially less well-endowed regions
doing the opposite. Consequently, initial regional disparity is anticipated to get larger in hetero-
geneously endowed countries. Empirically, C&T provide suggestive evidence from Russia’s market
liberalization reform that regions with better initial endowments tend to spend proportionally more
on infrastructure and develop more effective market institutions than regions with poor initial endow-
ments. In the case of China, Zhang (2006) shows that initial heterogeneous endowments relating to
economic structures and fiscal burdens help explain how fiscal decentralization has favored initially
better-endowed regions and exacerbated existing regional gaps.
11This approach, similar to the ones employed in Smart (1998, 2007) and Kthenbrger (2002), is
discussed in the next section of this paper
12See the model setup in the next section of this paper.
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the full implementation of the complex equalization system, which combines both
“horizontal” redistribution of tax revenues between rich and poor states and
“vertical” transfers from the federal government, implies varied extents of
equalization among states with different fiscal capacities–a feature that is important
for the empirical identification. Third, the recent reunification of East and West
Germany provides a “natural” classification of the poorly-endowed and
well-endowed regions, which is essential to empirically test the asymmetric policy
responses of initially heterogeneous regions as a result of competition for capital.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Theoretically, by incorporating fiscal
equalization program, which typically operates in many federal countries, into
C&T’s original model, this paper captures a relatively larger aspect of the
decentralized economies and provides further insight into the disciplining effect of
competition for capital among heterogeneous regions. In particular, the theory
reveals that an equalization scheme imposes an implicit tax on a region’s revenue
that is generated by its public input policy. Thus, if the equalization scheme
initially confronts well-endowed regions with a higher marginal tax rate on any
additional revenues produced by investment in public input relative to initially
poorly-endowed regions, then well-endowed regions have a relatively lower incentive
to expand the tax base by choosing higher levels of public input. As a consequence,
the original divergent expenditure policies on public input between poorly- and
well-endowed regions, driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments, will be
mitigated by the asymmetric incentives of the two types of regions in response to
the equalization system.
Empirically, I find strong evidence supporting the theoretical predictions. Using
a panel dataset of German states covering the period between 1995-2007, my
estimation results confirm C&T’s original hypothesis that initially well-endowed
states (i.e., West German states) tend to spend a higher proportion on public input
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than their poorly-endowed counterparts (i.e., East German states). Further, my
estimation that identifies the role of the equalization system suggests a negative
impact of a state’s own marginal tax rate of equalization and a positive impact of
the competing states’ marginal tax rate of equalization, on the state’s expenditure
on public input. This result validates the theoretical implication that the
equalization system can be used to serve as a mechanism to correct the “one-sided”
disciplining effect driven by competition among heterogeneous regions.
III.1.1 Review of the Related Literature
Since equalization systems distribute fiscal transfers to regions in a way that
correlates inversely with their fiscal capacities, and these fiscal capacities are largely
affected by strategic interactions among competing regions, a number of scholars
have observed that fiscal equalization may induce significant incentive effects on the
taxing policy of regional governments and eventually alter the equilibrium outcome
of tax competition. As initially outlined by Boadway and Flatters (1982) and later
formally modeled by several others, such as Smart (1998), Kthenbrger (2002, 2004,
2005), and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), fiscal equalization schemes are shown to
be able to limit tax competition and improve efficiency. This is because when a
region attempts to attract capital from other regions by cutting tax rates, it
increases its own tax base relative to the national average, which simultaneously
reduces the region’s entitlement for higher grants. Consequently, the fiscal
equalization system imposes incentives for regional governments to raise their tax
rates.13 More recently, Bttner (2006), Smart (2007) and Egger et al. (2010) examine
the equalization system of Canada and Germany and provide supporting evidence
13Hindriks et al. (2008) argue that the equalization system’s correction for inefficiency of tax
competition does not always hold in the presence of both tools of taxes and public investment. They
show that equalization is more likely to affect public investment choices but not equilibrium taxes
because the marginal retention rate of tax revenue decreases simultaneously with equalization which
sets a disincentive for tax-raising efforts.
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concerning the theoretical implications of the incentive effect of fiscal equalization
on regional governments’ tax policies.
Although there are a number of studies on how fiscal equalization schemes can
correct for the inefficient outcomes of tax competition, the literature on the
potential role of fiscal equalization in disciplining expenditure policies of regional
governments is scarce. Assuming homogeneity among all the competing regions,
Hauptmeier (2009) and Breuill et al. (2010) investigate the effects of equalization
transfers on the mix of local spending and conclude that the systematic bias of
public spending toward an over-provision of public input– as pointed out in Keen
and Marchand (1997)– is indeed alleviated via an equalization transfers system.
However, their framework does not allow them to explore how equalization transfers
may affect the asymmetric choice of expenditure policies across heterogeneous
regions, which is the main focus of this paper. More closely related to my analysis,
Ivanyna (2010) analyzes the role of fiscal transfers as an instrument in restraining
the malevolent behavior of local bureaucrats. He finds that when there is initial
heterogeneity in productivity, subsidizing private capital investments in
poorly-endowed regions directly leads to increased levels of public spending in all
regions and to lower levels of corruption. However, the main focus of Ivanya’s work
differs from mine in one significant way. Ivanyna introduces a benevolent social
planner in the model, and then discusses the ideal design of fiscal transfers system
so that the malevolent behavior of local bureaucrats can be restrained in every
region. Instead, I directly introduce an equalization transfers scheme, similar to that
used in many countries, into the inter-regional competition model and explore its
potential impact on the asymmetric expenditure policies chosen by heterogeneous
regions from a positive perspective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 develops the
theoretical model based on C&T’s original setup, and derives testable empirical
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implications. Section III.3 gives a brief introduction of Germany’s state equalization
system. Section III.4 sets up the empirical methodology and discusses the data.
Section III.5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section III.6 concludes.
III.2 The Model
III.2.1 Setup of the Model
The basic structure of the model is based on C&T. I introduce a common form of
an equalization transfer system to their original model and analyze its implications
for the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions.
Consider an economy consisting of N +M regions, indexed by i. Of these
regions, there are only two types of regions which differ in their initial
endowments.14 N denotes well-endowed regions, and M denotes poorly-endowed
regions. Since initial endowments affect the marginal productivity of capital locally
invested, other things being equal, capital is more productive in N than in M .
In each region a numeraire output is produced, and this output can either be
used as private consumption or government consumption. Specifically, the aggregate
production function is given by the standard Cobb-Douglas form
Fi(Ki, Ii) = AiK
α
i I
β
i (13)
where α > 0, β > 0, α + β < 1 and Ai > 0,
15 Ki is the amount of private capital
invested in region i and Ii is the amount of public input provided by the regional
government that enhances the productivity of private capital; Ai is the
region-specific technology parameter that reflects the effect of initial endowments on
14Endowment refers to those factors that affect the productivity of a region, including stocks of
natural resources, human capital or infrastructure, etc.
15For analytical convenience, other fixed factors such as land or labor are normalized to unity and
so not included in the production function. The assumption that α+ β < 1 , therefore, reflects this
point.
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productivity. It is further assumed that Ai = An represents the technology in
well-endowed regions, Ai = Am the technology in poorly-endowed regions, and so
An > Am.
Since capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across regions, the market
clearing condition implies an allocation of capital across regions such that its net
return in all regions is equalized to the given economy-wide net return to capital
(r), that is
(1− t)
∂Fi
∂Ki
= r (14)
where ∂Fi
∂Ki
denotes the marginal product of capital; t is the ad valorem tax rate on
output in region i and it is assumed to be fixed and coordinated by the central
government for all i.16. With equation (13), I can solve (14) for the capital allocated
in region i, to obtain Ki = (
1
r
(1− t)αAiI
β
i )
1
1−α . As indicated, capital flows to region
i are determined by both exogenous initial endowments (Ai) and endogenous public
input (Ii).
The objective of each region is to maximize the utility of a representative
household, and this utility depends on the consumption of some combination of
private goods and residential public goods17
Ui = (1− t)Fi + λgi (15)
where (1− t)Fi represents the disposable private goods and gi represents the
residential public goods provided by regional governments; λ > 0 measures
household’s preference for residential public goods relative to private goods.
16This assumption presents the advantage of focusing exclusively on the strategic interactions
of public input among regional governments. Indeed, in their extension analysis, C&T show that
incorporating endogenous tax rate competition is likely to strengthen the main results of the analysis.
17Residential public goods refer to those public goods that are directly consumed by the residents
in the economy and do not enhance the productivity of private capital in any respect. As a matter
of fact, equation (15) can also be interpreted as the objective function of a partially self-interested
government, in which case gi stands for incumbent officials’ consumption of budget funds (C&T,
p820).
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Regional governments use their output tax revenues (tFi) and transfers (Ti) received
from the central government to finance the residential public good (gi) and the
public input provision (Ii). The budget constraint of each region is
Ii + gi = tFi + Ti.
18
Consider now the newly introduced transfer system. As noted in the
introductory section, the system I assume here is a common form of an equalization
transfer system that distributes funds to regions on the basis of the representative
tax system (RTS) methodology. More specifically, it sets the per capita transfer
received or contributed for each region equal to the difference between its capacity
and the national average fiscal capacity, multiplied by the national average effective
tax rate. Algebraically, region i’s total transfers received or contributed are given by
Ti = υit¯(
∑
i Fi∑
i pi
−
Fi
pi
)pi (16)
where pi is the population size in region i;
∑
i Fi∑
i pi
represents the per capita national
average tax base; Fi
pi
is region i’s per capita tax base; t¯ is the national average tax
rate. Tax rates are exogenously fixed across all regions, so t¯ = t. The term in
brackets measures the deviation of a region’s per capita tax base from the national
average. A positive value indicates the region has below-average fiscal capacity and,
thus, is eligible for transfers. For negative values, the region has to pay a
contribution or negative transfer. The policy parameter, 0 6 υi 6 1, in the
equalization formula determines the extent to which the deviations of region i’s
fiscal capacity are equalized.19 Summing up, the budget constraint of region i can
18Note that Ti = 0 in C&T’s original model. I will show how this new element leads to a different
equilibrium in the latter part of this section.
19Typically, the policy parameter υi would be the same for all regions. However, there are countries
that allow more equalization in certain economically disadvantaged regions. The pool of funds may
also be allocated in a manner not proportional with a constant υi but instead to fill the gap of the
poorer regions with priority.
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be rewritten as
Ii + gi = tFi + υit¯(
∑
i Fi∑
i pi
−
Fi
pi
)pi (17)
I examine a game in which all regional governments simultaneously choose the
levels of Ii, and then the investors make the decisions on where to invest. I then
compare the equilibriums for two cases: with and without the equalization scheme.
III.2.2 Equilibrium
The problem of each region’s government is to choose its public input (Ii)
independently so as to maximize its objective function (15), subject to its budget
constraint (17). The resulting equilibrium of investments on public input and
capital allocation are given as follows, while the mathematical induction can be
found in the Appendix A.
I∗i = (
β
λ
)
1−α
1−α−β (
α(1− t)
r
)
α
1−α−βA
1
1−α−β
i τ
1−α
1−α−β
i (18)
K∗i = (
β
λ
)
β
1−α−β (
α(1− t)
r
)
1−α−β+αβ
(1−α−β)(1−α)A
1
1−α−β
i τ
β
1−α−β
i (19)
where τi ≡ (1− t+ λt)
1
1−α
+ ( pi∑
i pi
− 1
1−α
)λυit > 0, with the properties that
∂τi
∂υi
< 0, ∂τi
∂pi
> 0. Equation (18) immediately gives the following result.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, a region’s investments on public input I∗i is
increasing in both Ai and τi.
Considering the relative investments on public input and capital allocation in
both well-endowed and poorly-endowed regions by taking the ratios of their optimal
public input levels and capital received respectively.
I∗n
I∗m
= (
An
Am
)
1
1−α−β (
τn
τm
)
1−α
1−α−β (20)
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K∗n
K∗m
= (
An
Am
)
1
1−α−β (
τn
τm
)
β
1−α−β (21)
With these expressions of the equilibrium, I can analyze two cases:
(i) Equilibrium without equalization. In this case, I assume the absence of the
equalization system from the model, which by definition, reduces the model to the
original C&T model. Mathematically, this is equivalent to solving the current model
in an extreme case that υi = 0, which in turn gives the condition τn = τm.
Equations (20) and (21) are then reduced to I
∗
n
I∗m
= K
∗
n
K∗m
= ( An
Am
)
1
1−α−β— the original
equilibrium of C&T. Clearly, the greater is the asymmetry in initial endowments
An
Am
, the larger is the gap of capital allocation K
∗
n
K∗m
and optimal investments on public
input I
∗
n
I∗m
between the two types of regions. Since the total stock of capital is fixed in
the economy, i.e., NK∗n +MK
∗
m = K¯, an increase of
An
Am
must lead to an increase in
K∗n and a decrease in K
∗
m in order to ensure an increase of
K∗n
K∗m
. Meanwhile, the
decision rule for investments in public input in equation (29) reveals a strictly
increasing function of Ii(Ki, Ai) in both Ki and Ai.
20 This implies that the increase
of An
Am
will be converted to an increase in I∗n and a decrease in I
∗
m. Thus, the
heterogeneity of initial endowments leads to the so called “one-sided” disciplining
effect as described in C&T.
(ii) Equilibrium with equalization. In this case, the term, τn
τm
6= 0, will be present
on the RHS of equations (20) and (21). It is, therefore, straightforward to expect
that if an increase of An
Am
is offset by a decrease of τn
τm
, then the detected “one-sided”
disciplining effect can be corrected within the model. The following proposition
characterizing the role of the equalization transfers can be stated.
Proposition 4. Other things being equal, as τn
τm
decreases, K
∗
n
K∗m
and (so) I
∗
n
I∗m
becomes
smaller.
20See Appendix A for details.
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Since τi is a decreasing function of υi, and an increasing function of pi, this
proposition suggests that other things being equal, if (a) the equalization transfer
scheme has the property that the equalization degree in well-endowed regions is
higher than the degree in poorly-endowed regions, i.e., υn > υm; or (b)
poorly-endowed regions are more populated regions relative to well-endowed regions,
i.e., pn < pm, then the divergent expenditure policies caused by the heterogeneity of
initial endowments can be corrected via the equalization system.21
III.2.3 Interpretation
The interpretation for the role of equalization system revealed by Proposition 4 can
be captured by the concept of the marginal tax rate of equalization system
(MTRE). This concept is defined as the fraction of one unit of additional tax
revenue in a region that flows out of the region due to the functioning of the system
(Baretti et al., 2002).22
More formally, let us rewrite the budget constraint (17) in a way that total tax
revenue of region i can be grouped into a single term,
Ii + gi = (1 + υi
pi∑
i pi
− υi)tFi + υit
pi
∑
j 6=i Fj∑
i pi
. Now consider that the region
experiences one unit increase in total tax revenue tFi, due to the mechanism of
equalization transfer system, the total net gain of region i amounts to
(1 + υi
pi∑
i pi
− υi). Thus, the fraction that flows out of the region, and so the
marginal tax rate of equalization system for region i is, MTREi = (1−
pi∑
i pi
)υi.
23 It
clearly indicates that a larger υi or smaller pi leads to a higher MTRE in the region.
Since υi captures the extent to which the gap between the region’s own fiscal
21As a matter of fact, even if well-endowed regions are more populated regions relative to poorly-
endowed regions, i.e., pn > pm, the equalization scheme with the feature that υn > υm can still be
used to correct for the divergent expenditure policies.
22Note that under an equalization transfer system, a higher fiscal capacity will reduce the region’s
transfers from the equalization system or increase its contributions.
23See Baretti et al. (2002) for a similar formula in calculating marginal tax rate of equalization
transfers.
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capacity and the national average is equalized, it has a direct effect on the fraction
that will flow out of the region. On the other hand, a smaller population size pi
implies a smaller share of total nationwide tax revenue in the equalization system,
which in turn means a larger outflow for the additional increment of tax revenue.
Therefore, the mechanism implied by Proposition 4 suggests a larger equalization
degree or a smaller population size in well-endowed regions is equivalent to a higher
value of MTRE in these regions. More generally, incorporating the MTRE to
Propositions 3-4 gives us the following implication for empirical tests.
Testable Implication 1.(i) In equilibrium, a region’s investments on public input
I∗i is increasing in initial endowments Ai, but decreasing in marginal tax rate of
equalization MTREi; (ii) other things being equal, an increase of MTREi or a
decrease of MTRE−i (−i indexes the other type of regions rather than type i) will
lead to a decrease of I∗i .
Intuitively, the MTRE captures the marginal tax rate on any additional tax
revenues that are produced by investments on public input. A higher level of MTRE
in a region implies a lower incentive for the region to expand the tax base by
choosing higher level of public input investment in order to obtain more equalization
transfers or contribute less equalization transfers. A higher level of MTRE in the
competing regions, by contrast, would reduce the extent of strategic response of
these regions to the home region’s expenditure policy, which results in an increase of
investments on public input in the home region.
Although, as we have just seen, both the policy parameter υi and population size
pi play an important role in the determination of the MTRE, the latter factor is
simply not a feasible choice variable in the hands of the central government. From a
policy perspective, it is indeed the parameter υi that is controlled by the central
government that fundamentally shapes the role of the equalization system.
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Understanding this point and knowing the direction to which this policy parameter
affects the behaviors of regional governments is essential for a better design of the
equalization system. In particular, if the central government’s objective is to achieve
a more balancing outcome of regional expenditure policies on public input, it would
be necessary for the central government to impose a higher equalization degree υi,
and so a higher MTRE in well-endowed regions than in its poorly-endowed
counterparts. Nevertheless, if the opposite is observed, then the initially divergent
situation is more likely to be strengthened as a result of the introduction of the
equalization system. It should therefore be the central government’s attention to
ensure the emergence of the former case by properly distributing the policy
parameters υi in the design of the system, provided the “one-sided” disciplining
effect caused by endowment heterogeneity is a matter of concern for the central
government.
III.3 Equalization Transfers in Germany
Germany is a federation of sixteen states (La¨nder), ten of which are from the former
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the remaining five are from the
former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The City of Berlin, which
was formerly split between East and West Germany but reunified in 1990, consists
of the sixteenth state. The country’s tax legislation is highly centralized and
allocates virtually no direct autonomy to the states in determining either the tax
base or the tax rates. The main sources of revenue are generated through corporate
income, personal income and value added (VAT) taxes and are required by law to
be shared among the federal, state and local governments. While the detailed
sharing arrangement for VAT between the federal and state governments has
changed frequently since the fiscal reform (of West Germany) in 1969, the federal
share of VAT has stabilized at around 53%, leaving the state governments’ share at
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around 45% in recent years (Hepp and von Hagen, 2012). The sharing of corporate
income tax and personal income tax revenue has been historically stable over the
past three decades. The revenue from corporate income tax is shared on a 50-50
basis between the federal and state governments, and 15% of the revenue from
personal income tax is allocated to municipalities while the rests are split equally
between the federal and state governments (each receiving 42.5%).
Since the revenue structure varies significantly across states, the revenue sharing
system involves considerable redistribution among states. Beyond this effort, the
country operates an extensive system of equalization transfers
(la¨nderfinanzausgleich, LFA) for the sixteen states with an explicitly defined
objective to assure “uniform living standards throughout the territory of the
federation”.24 The key elements of the system were introduced in the fiscal reform
(of West Germany) in 1969. It was initially designed for the ten West German
states (leaving out the former West-Berlin) until the five East German states and
the new united city of Berlin were integrated into the system in 1995. The LFA is
based on article 107 of the German constitution and consists of a three-stage
process. The first two stages are largely characterized by horizontal redistribution
between “rich” and “poor” states while the last stage involves additional vertical
grants from the federal government to “poor” states.
During the first stage (known as “VAT redistribution”), 25% of the state’s share
of total national VAT revenue is used for horizontal redistribution.25 That is, any
state where the fiscal capacity per capita26 is less than 92% of the national average
receives VAT transfers to bring it up to the level of 92% of the national average. If
the total amount available for the VAT redistribution is not large enough, the
24Grundgesetz (German Constitution), Articles 72 and 106.
25The remaining 75% of the state’s share of total national VAT revenues is reallocated among all
states according to the state’s population share (equal per capita basis), and so it does not involve
equalization function.
26Fiscal capacity considered at this stage includes all pure state taxes plus a state’s share of
corporate income tax and personal income tax.
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transfers are scaled back proportionally. In contrast, if the total amount available is
larger than what is needed, then the residuals are again redistributed among all
states according to the state’s population share.
During the second stage (known as “fiscal equalization among the states”), each
state’s relative status is determined by the ratio of the state’s fiscal capacity to its
fiscal need.27 For those states having ratios greater than 100%, they contribute to
the system; whereas for those states whose ratios are less than 100%, they receive
additional transfers from the system. More specifically, for “receiving” states: if the
ratio lies at the interval of (0%, 92%], then the gap between the ratio and 92% of
the national average is fully closed by transfers, and the remaining difference
between 92% and the national average is subsidized at 37.5%; if the original ratio
lies at the interval of (92%, 100%], only 37.5% of the difference between the ratio
and the national average is subsidized. In the case of the “contributing” states, the
contribution rates follow a progressive schedule: if the ratio is in the interval of
(100%, 101%], 15% of the difference between the ratio and the national average
must be contributed; if the ratio belongs to the interval of (101%, 110%], an
additional 66% of its fiscal capacity above 101% of the national average is
contributed; if the ratio is above 110%, another 80% of the part lies above 110% of
the national average is contributed. Finally, the total contributions of the
“contributing” states are raised or lowered by a factor to ensure that total
contributions equal to the total transfers received.
During the third stage (known as “supplementary federal grants”), two types of
vertical grants from the federal government are distributed. The first one (type I)
provides additional grants to fill 90% of any remaining gap between poorer states’
27Fiscal capacity in this stage is calculated as the sum of state tax revenues, which includes the
total VAT revenues received in the first stage, and 50% of the tax revenues of its municipalities.
Fiscal need is simply the per capita average of all the states’ fiscal capacity multiplied by the state’s
population. In order to account for the special financial needs of the city-states, populations in
Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg are valued at 135% of their actual values.
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fiscal capacity and the national average. The second type of supplementary grants
(type II) are general purpose grants which are paid to account for special needs such
as special allocations to cover above-average administration costs.28
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Figure 1: Marginal Rates of Compensation/Contribution Before and After 2005 in the
Second Stage of the LFA
Even though the size of the above LFA system expanded considerably in 1995
when East German states and the new city state of Berlin entered the system (the
so-called “Solidarity Part I”), it has operated with virtually unchanged
arrangements since 1969. A new arrangement came into effect from 2005 onwards
and will last until 2019 (the so-called “Solidarity Part II”). The new arrangements
reformed numerous interconnected elements of the existing system, for example,
replacing the current system of a replenishment rate of 100% by a relative
replenishment system in the VAT redistribution stage (LFA, stage 1); changing the
fiscal equalization among states (LFA, stage 2) from the graduated tariff to a steady
and linear tariff, etc.29 However, the basic structure and mechanisms of the system
28Since these are beyond the interest of this paper, they will not be discussed any further in this
paper. For more information, see Brand (2006).
29See Losco (2006) and Werner (2008) for further discussion on the new arrangements of the LFA
system in Germany after 2005.
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have not been changed. As an example, Figure 1 illustrates the resulting main
differences of the second stage of the LFA system before and after 2005. The solid
line captures the detailed arrangements of the second stage of the LFA system
before 2005. The dashed line describes the new arrangements after (including) 2005.
As shown, under the new system, if the ratio of a state’s fiscal capacity to its fiscal
need is less than 80%, the gap will be closed up to 75%; after that, the
compensation rate declines linearly to a value of 70% when the ratio reaches 93%;
finally, the compensation rate declines linearly again with a steeper slope to a value
of 44% when the ratio approaches 100%. A similar tiered system is also applied to
the “contributing states”, triggering different contribution rates depending on the
states’ fiscal capacity—less than 107%, between 107% and 120%, or greater than
120% of the fiscal need (Bayern Staatsministerium der Finanzen, 2005).
Following the above detailed settings of the system, I calculate the marginal tax
rate of equalization for all the states in the period covered. Table 2 reports the
average values of the MTRE for each state,30 separated by different historical
periods. As shown, the magnitudes of the MTRE across states are determined by
the two main factors, which I highlighted in subsection III.2.3–equalization degree
υi and population size pi. Larger degree of equalization or smaller population size
results in larger MTRE. Since the German system imposes a relatively higher degree
of equalization for the “receiving” states than the “contributing” states, it leads to
the result that East German states, all of which are “receiving” states, having, on
average, a higher value of MTRE than West German states, a large part of which
are “contributing” states.31 However, the 2005 reform reversed this situation
moderately by reducing the MTRE in East German states while increasing the
30The values reflect either the reduced amount that the “receiving” states would otherwise receive
from the system or the additional amount that the “contributing” states have to contribute, given
a one unit increase in its income tax revenue.
31This situation raises a caution message that the German system may has been designed and im-
plemented in the opposite direction as opposed to the desirable direction suggested by the theoretical
model for correcting the “one-sided” discipline effect.
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Table 2: Average Value of Marginal Tax Rate of Equalization in Germany
States Overall Solidarity Part I Solidarity Part II
(1995-2007) (1995-2004) (2005-2007)
East Germany
Berlin 0.908 0.912 0.893
Brandenburg 0.923 0.925 0.917
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.923 0.925 0.918
Sachsen 0.922 0.924 0.916
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.923 0.925 0.917
Thu¨ringen 0.923 0.925 0.917
West Germany
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0.756 0.759 0.745
Bayern 0.752 0.757 0.737
Bremen 0.893 0.921 0.797
Hamburg 0.776 0.776 0.777
Hessen 0.791 0.797 0.773
Niedersachsen 0.896 0.894 0.905
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.753 0.736 0.810
Rheinland-Pfalz 0.894 0.888 0.913
Saarland 0.923 0.925 0.918
Schleswig-Holstein 0.890 0.883 0.913
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: The simulation is conducted by assuming a one unit increase in income tax revenue.
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MTRE in some of West German states in the “Solidarity Part II” period (see Table
2).
III.4 Empirical Methodology and Data
The model in section III.2 predicts that regional heterogeneity of initial endowments
leads to divergent expenditure policies on public input, while a system of
equalization can be effective in correcting this distortion. In this section, I discuss
the empirical strategy with the objective of testing these predictions that are
explicitly summarized in Testable Implication 1, using a panel dataset of sixteen
German states from 1995 to 2007. As I outlined in the introduction, one of the main
reasons in supporting the selection of Germany as my case study is that I aim to
employ East and West German states as the classification of initially poorly- and
well-endowed regions, which otherwise could be a quite challenging task.32 Since
East German states have only been fully integrated into the state fiscal equalization
system since 1995, I use year 1995 as the starting period in my analysis.
III.4.1 Specification
III.4.1.1 The baseline specification
In order to identify the prediction revealed in Testable Implication 1(i), I estimate
the following baseline dynamic specification
Iit = ρIit−1 + λwesti + δmtreit−1 +Xit−1β + ηi + ttt + εit (22)
32In the theoretical model, I clearly defined initially poorly-endowed regions as those regions that
have lower output productivity, while initially well-endowed regions refer to those regions having
higher output productivity. Since the large productivity gap between East Germany and West
Germany has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Barrell and Te Velde, 2000; Burda and
Hunt, 2001; Czarnitzki, 2005), my classification should be viewed to make a lot of economic sense.
For instance, the aggregate productivity (measured by GDP per employee) in East Germany reached
only 35% of the West Germany level in 1991 (Czarnitzki, 2005).
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to explore the impacts of a state’s initial status of endowments and its MTRE on
the state’s expenditure on public input. In the specification, Iit is the dependent
variable, which is defined as the share of public input expenditure in total
budgetary expenditure of state i in year t. Iit−1 is a one-period (timely) lagged
dependent variable, which is included to account for the high degree of persistence
in the government policies that is typically observed in the data (e.g., Foucault
et al., 2008; Kappeler and Va¨lila¨, 2008; Ghinamo et al., 2010; Klemm and
Van Parys, 2012). westi is a dummy variable for West German states, which takes
the value of 1 if state i belongs to West German states and 0 otherwise. This
variable captures my classification of initially well- and poorly-endowed regions.
mtreit−1 is the marginal tax rate of the equalization system of state i in year t− 1,
which reflects the marginal tax rate on any additional tax revenues produced by
investments on public input. It is lagged by one period to avoid the potential
endogeneity issue of this variable. Furthermore, the specification includes state fixed
effects (ηi) to control for unexplained heterogeneity across states that are constant
over time and also a linear time trend (ttt).
33
As control variables Xit−1 I seek to capture the general economic, fiscal,
demographic, and political factors of significance in determining public input
expenditure. This leads to the inclusion of real GDP per capita, openness, budget
surplus, public debt, and population density. Real GDP per capita serves as a
measure of the income level, as higher incomes are generally related to stronger
demand for purely public services. Openness, which is calculated as the ratio of
total trades (import plus export) to GDP, aims to capture the exposure of a state to
trade and competition for capital. Following the studies by Mehrotra and Vlil
(2006) and Kappeler and Va¨lila¨ (2008), the short- and long-term fiscal environment
is captured by the budget surplus of the state government and its public debt
33The inclusion of state fixed effects also helps dealing with endogeneity that may arise from time
invariant omitted variables.
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respectively. Both are measured in relative to GDP and have been shown to be
significant in the determination of public investment in the literature. Population
density serves as the needs for and cost of public input networks that differ between
densely and sparsely populated regions (Kappeler and Va¨lila¨, 2008). I also include a
set of political variables capturing the effects of elections and political preferences.
These include a dummy variable for an election year, which takes the value 1 for
each election year of the state and 0 otherwise; a dummy variable for partisan
affiliation, which takes the value 1 if the state government in power in that year
belongs to social-democratic party and 0 otherwise. Finally, all control variables are
lagged by one period to avoid any bias arising from the possible joint determination
of these variables and the dependent variable.
III.4.1.2 Regional interactions
Testable Implication 1(ii) reveals that a state’s expenditure on public input reacts
positively to its competing states’ MTRE. This correlation is obtained under the
regional competition framework, which, by its nature, implies another positively
strategic interaction between a state’s public input expenditure and its competing
states’ public input expenditure. Thus, these properties result in the inclusion of
the spatially lagged dependent variable and the spatially lagged of MTRE in the
competing states to specification (22), which is also known as a dynamic spatial lag
specification in the most general form of
Iit = ρIit−1+
∑
j 6=i
θijIjt+λwesti+ δmtreit−1+
∑
j 6=i
ψijmtrejt−1+Xit−1β+ ηi+ ttt+ εit
(23)
where j denotes all the competing states of state i. Since the focus is on the
competition between the two types of states with heterogeneity in initial
endowments, j represents the opposite type of state of state i. More specifically, if
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state i belongs to initially poorly-endowed states (i.e., East German states), then
state j represents all initially well-endowed states (i.e., West German states); vice
versus. However, this model cannot be estimated as it stands, as there are too many
parameters (θij and ψij) to be estimated. The usual method adopted in spatial
econometrics to address this issue is to estimate the following
Iit = ρIit−1 + θI−it + λwesti + δmtreit−1 + ψmtre−it−1 +Xit−1β + ηi + ttt + εit (24)
where I−it and mtre−it−1 are the weighted average of state j’s public input
expenditure and MTRE respectively, i.e.


I−it =
∑
j 6=iwijIjt
mtre−it−1 =
∑
j 6=iwijmtrejt−1
(25)
and wij are exogenously chosen weights, normalized so that
∑
j 6=iwij = 1.
An important decision concerns the choice of the weights. As emphasized above,
the spatial interaction in this analysis is between initially poorly- and well-endowed
states, which renders the use of geographic criteria in creating the weighting
matrices infeasible.34 Instead, I consider the following three possible weighting
schemes that are proposed by Devereux et al. (2008). The first one (denoted as
“weight I”), which serves as a benchmark, is very simple; weights are assumed to be
34In the standard practice of the spatial econometrics literature, a common assumption is the
geographically close jurisdictions interact more strongly. This leads to the use of two common
methods in defining the weights. The first one is based on a contiguity matrix, where the value 1
is assigned if two jurisdictions share the same border and 0 otherwise. An alternative is to use the
inverse distances of two jurisdictions as weights (e.g., Foucault et al., 2008; Ghinamo et al., 2010;
Jacobs et al., 2010; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). Since the neighbors of a state may not be in
the opposite type of this state at the same time, so the contiguity method may not coincide with
my primary objective to explore the competition among initially poorly- and well-endowed states.
Similarly, the inverse distance method is not employed due to the fact that geographically closer
states of a state may be those states of the same type of this state, which again does not identify
my theoretical question. However, these two methods are employed later in this study to test the
robustness of the results by relaxing the assumption that the competition is only conducted among
two types of regions.
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uniform, i.e. wij =
1
nj
, where nj is the number of states classified as state j.
35 An
alternative weighing scheme (denoted as “weight II”) takes into account the relative
wealth level of each state j. The typical element of the weights is, wij =
yjt
∑nj
j=1 yjt
,
where yjt denotes real GDP per capita of state j in year t. A final weighing scheme
(denoted as “weight III”) is intended to capture the relative extent of competition of
each state j. The typical element of the weights is, wij =
ejt
∑nj
j=1 ejt
, where ejt denotes
openness of state j in year t. These latter two methods present a better
approximation of the relative wealth levels and exposure to competition of the two
types of regions involved in the competition, and serve as good candidates for
robustness checks. It should be noted that I also relax the restriction that the
competition is only conducted among initially poorly- and well-endowed states in
order to examine the spatial interactions among all the states. This analysis and the
associated results are discussed in detail later.
III.4.2 Estimation
In order to estimate specifications (22) and (24) unbiasedly and efficiently, two
critical endogeneity issues have to be addressed. First, in all these specifications, the
lagged dependent variable is endogenous since it is correlated with the state fixed
effects in the composite error term (ηi + εit), which yields biased and inconsistent
results if OLS or fixed effect estimators are applied (Nickell, 1981). Second,
specification (24) shows that expenditure policies of the competitors enter
contemporaneously, so that the competitors’ expenditure decisions are endogenous
and correlated with the error term (εit). OLS yields a biased estimate of parameter
ρ (Anselin, 1988).36 Beyond the endogeneity issues, another important concern is
35More specifically, if state j is initially well-endowed states (i.e., West German states), then nj
equals ten, which is the ten West German states; if state j is initially poorly-endowed states (i.e.,
East German states), then nj equals 6, which is the five East German states plus the new united
city of Berlin.
36This second endogeneity is a typical issue in the spatial econometrics literature. Two conven-
tional approaches for getting consistent estimates of the spatial parameter are suggested in the liter-
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the estimation of the time-invariant variable westi in all the specifications. It is well
known that dealing with the state fixed effects by the fixed effect estimator or first
difference method will wipe out this time-invariant variable, which is one of the key
variables in this study.
To circumvent all these problems, I employ the system GMM estimator
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), that has been used quite often in the
recent studies on tax competition with dynamic features (Foucault et al., 2008;
Ghinamo et al., 2010; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). This estimator combines the
moment conditions from both the first-differenced equation of the estimating
equation and the estimating equation in levels, and then estimates the parameters
by GMM.37 In addition, following the standard spatial econometrics literature
(Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), I also use the
competitors’ weighted average of explanatory variables, including weighted real
GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted public debt,
and weighted population density, as extra exogenous instruments for the spatial lag
variable (I−it) in specification (24).
38 Regarding the time-invariant variable westi,
although it sweeps out in the first-differenced equation, the levels equation still
allows for identification of this variable since all instruments for the level equation
are assumed to be orthogonal to state fixed effects (Roodman, 2009a).
The overall validity of the instruments used in the regressions as well as the
serial correlation in the residuals are evaluated by the Hansen test (or
overidentifying restriction test) and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test respectively.
The former statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are not
ature. The first approach is to use instrumental variables (Anselin, 1988). An alternative approach
is to rely on the maximum likelihood (See Brueckner, 2003, for more discussion). Although both
approaches yield consistent estimate of spatial parameter, the latter method is generally challenging
in computation.
37In dealing with the endogenous variables, the system GMM estimator uses lagged levels to
instrument the endogenous differences and lagged first differences to instrument levels.
38The weights are constructed in the same way as the ones I discussed previously.
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correlated with the residuals, while the latter tests the presence of auto-correlation
in the residuals.39 Both statistics are necessary to confirm the validity of the
instruments used. Finally, given my small sample size and a significant amount of
additional instruments introduced, I restrict the lags to three and four years and
collapse the instrument matrix when estimating specification (24) in order to avoid
the problem of too many instruments as discussed in Roodman (2009a,b).
Ideally, one would also include time dummies in the specifications to prevent the
most likely form of cross-state correlation, contemporaneous correlation. However, it
generates two problems in my context. Due to the large amount of instruments
created by the system GMM estimator together with the external instruments,
adding time dummies may weaken the Hansen test and overfit the endogenous
variable (Roodman, 2009a,b). Additionally, Devereux et al. (2008) and Klemm and
Van Parys (2012) point out that the inclusion of time dummies in a model with
spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity issue among the spatial
lag variables and the time dummies,40 which makes it hard to identify the true
impact of each variable. Therefore, following the suggestion by Devereux et al.
(2008) and Klemm and Van Parys (2012), I add a linear time trend variable that
captures common trend for all states, instead of using time dummies.
III.4.3 Data
The panel dataset covers sixteen German states over the period 1995-2007. In this
subsection, I explain the dataset in further detail, with a special focus on the
measurements of the composition of public input expenditure and the MTRE.
39Given the structure of the first-differences equation in the system GMM estimator, the first order
correlation in the residuals is usually expected, but the second order correlation in the residuals
should be avoided for a valid specification.
40The reason here is that the inclusion of time dummies is equivalent to adding the average value
of the dependent variable in each year, which by its nature is highly correlated with the spatial lag
variables.
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To begin with, Iit is defined as the sum of state i’s government expenditure on
productive items in year t as percentage of the state’s total budgetary expenditure.
Since the functional classification of productive items turns out to be quite
controversial in the literature, in this study, I follow the classification method
defined by Tho¨ne (2005), and recently employed by Hauptmeier (2009) in the
German context. In Tho¨ne’s original study, he conducted an in-depth survey on the
productivity effects of different government expenditure categories in the empirical
literature, and then applied the resulting insights to the German system of
budgetary accounting to generate a meaningful indicator for each of the expenditure
categories. More specifically, the following two main expenditure categories are
identified as productive expenditure based on his study: public infrastructure; and
education, research and development (R&D). The first category includes
expenditures on streets, waterways and ports, rail and public transport, aviation,
and municipal services. The latter includes expenditures on schools and pre-school
education, sponsorship of pupils, students, etc., universities, and research and
development (outside universities). In general, expenditures on public infrastructure
have the most direct economic impacts by reducing firms’ production and
transaction costs, while the economic impacts of expenditures on education and
R&D are more long-term as it facilitates the build-up and maintenance of human
capital in the economy (Kappeler and Va¨lila¨, 2008). Data on the detailed
expenditure items are obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office. Figure 2
provides an overview of the evolution of public input expenditure in Germany over
the time period covered. It shows averages for the measure of public input
expenditure, classified by the whole country, East Germany and West Germany.
The figure reveals a persistent tendency of higher expenditures on public input in
West Germany than in East Germany, which tentatively sheds some light on C&T’s
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original hypothesis that initially well-endowed regions tend to spend more on public
input than initially poorly-endowed regions.
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Figure 2: Average of Expenditure on Public Input Over the Years
The key variable of interest, MTRE, is simulated from a more complicated
process since it is not directly observable. Note that the concept of MTRE is
broadly defined as the fraction of one additional unit of own source revenue that
flows out of the region in responding to the equalization mechanism. The fraction
for each state in a particular year depends on the state’s fiscal capacity in relative to
its fiscal need, and the resulting equalization parameter it faces corresponds to the
system arrangement specified in section III.3. Given the German’s equalization
system is a three-stage procedure with varied definitions of fiscal capacity and
equalized parameters in each stage, I resort to the simulation method to calculate
the MTRE for each state in each year, based on a rich set of information. More
specifically, I utilize a state’s relevant tax revenue and population data defined in
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each of the three equalization stages to determine the particular equalization
formula it should face, and then calculate the resulting changes of equalization
payments for a hypothesized one unit increase in tax revenue. The overall MTRE
for a state is obtained by adding the resulting changes of equalization payments in
all the three stages, adjusted by the changing values of the hypothesized increase of
own source tax revenue in different stages. A brief description of this simulation
process can be found in the Appendix A. Very detailed data on calculating a state’s
fiscal capacity and fiscal need in all three stages are obtained from the annual
enactments (1995-2007) to implement the fiscal equalization law.
Data for all other variables are derived from the German Federal Statistical
Office, with the exception of information on election year and partisan affiliation,
which in turn are collected from the website http://www.election.de/. Summary
statistics of all the variables are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Share of public input expenditure (Iit) 0.294 0.041 0.212 0.386 208
West 0.625 0.485 0 1 208
MTRE 0.865 0.074 0.690 0.925 208
GDP per capita, log 10.132 0.272 9.686 10.758 208
Openness 0.437 0.233 0.079 1.032 208
Budget surplus (% of GDP) -0.013 0.015 -0.072 0.056 208
Public debt (% of GDP) 0.299 0.121 0.087 0.724 208
Population density, log 5.745 1.112 4.283 8.268 208
Election 0.212 0.409 0 1 208
Party affiliation 0.505 0.501 0 1 208
Source: Author’s calculations.
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III.5 Results
III.5.1 Main Results
All specifications are estimated by the system GMM method explained above, along
with robust and finite sample corrected standard errors. The Hansen test and the
Arellano and Bond (1991) test are reported at the bottom of each table, indicating
the validity of the instruments used. Given the fact that the German equalization
system changed slightly in 2005, I present the estimation results for the time period
1995-2004 as main results for the analysis, and later report the results from a longer
period as robustness checks.
Column (1) in Table 4 reports the estimation results of the baseline specification
(22) assuming no regional interactions. I find a positive and significant coefficient of
the measurement of heterogeneous regions (westi) in line with C&T’s original
hypothesis that initially well-endowed regions (i.e., West German states) tend to
spend higher proportion on public input expenditure than their poorly-endowed
counterparts (i.e., East German states). A negative and significant estimate of the
MTRE implies that higher marginal tax rate on any potential increments of tax
revenues produced by investments on public input cuts a state’s expenditures on
public input, supporting Testable Implication 1 (i). Turning to the effects of regional
interactions, I present the estimation results of specification (24) in columns (2), (3),
and (4) of Table 4 with alternative definitions of weighting matrices described in the
previous section. Similarly, results are strongly in line with the theoretical
predictions described in Testable Implication 1(ii)–the competing states’ MTRE
positively and significantly affects the home state’s public input expenditure.
Considering the magnitudes of the effects, West German states spend roughly 3
to 4 percentage points more on public input expenditure than East German states.
A one percentage point increase in the MTRE will reduce the proportion of public
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Table 4: Estimation Results for the Effects of Initial Endowment and the Equalization
System
Dependent variable: Iit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight I Weight II Weight III
Iit−1 0.334*** 0.530*** 0.568*** 0.563***
(2.98) (4.92) (5.89) (5.48)
I−it 0.969*** 0.858*** 1.109***
(4.14) (4.03) (4.46)
West 0.037*** 0.038** 0.026* 0.030*
(3.98) (2.54) (1.87) (1.81)
MTREit−1 -0.087** -0.055* -0.049* -0.048*
(-2.52) (-1.95) (-1.76) (-1.81)
MTRE−it−1 0.245*** 0.271*** 0.286***
(3.47) (3.55) (2.64)
GDP per capita t− 1 -0.091*** -0.069*** -0.065*** -0.066***
(-4.00) (-4.17) (-4.16) (-4.22)
Openness t− 1 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.017
(0.71) (0.77) (1.04) (1.01)
Budget surplus t− 1 -0.236** -0.113 -0.143 -0.162
(-2.22) (-1.00) (-1.30) (-1.55)
Public debt t− 1 -0.169*** -0.126*** -0.122*** -0.125***
(-5.12) (-4.43) (-4.63) (-4.69)
Population density t− 1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.16) (1.33) (1.31) (1.38)
Election t− 1 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.82) (1.52) (1.39) (1.45)
Party affiliation t− 1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.76) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.83)
Constant 1.189*** 0.363* 0.330* 0.254
(4.92) (1.7) (1.71) (1.17)
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144 144 144 144
Number of states 16 16 16 16
Hansen test (p-value) 0.346 0.98 0.883 0.924
AR(1) (p-value) 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002
AR(2) (p-value) 0.688 0.788 0.871 0.742
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1995-2004. Models are esti-
mated by system GMM estimator. I−it andMTRE−it−1 are the weighted averages of
values of the competing states (the opposite type of states)’ public input expenditures
and marginal tax rate of equalization respectively. I−it is instrumented by weighted
real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted public
debt, and weighted population density. The lagged dependent variable is instru-
mented by higher-order lags (restricted to t − 3 to t − 4) of the dependent variable.
The remaining explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous and therefore
also included in the instrument matrix. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10% level, respectively.
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input expenditure by about 0.09 percentage points in the estimation without
considering regional interactions, and by about 0.05 percentage points when
controlling regional interactions. As summarized in Table 2, most states have a
value of MTRE around or above 80%. This implies that, other things being equal, if
the MTRE is reduced to zero, state public input expenditure will be increased on
average by about 14%.41 The effect from the competing states’ MTRE turns out to
be relatively much stronger, it has an estimated coefficient amounts to roughly five
times as large as the home state’s MTRE, suggesting that spatial interactions play
an important role in the determination of the home state’s expenditure policy.
Nevertheless, this relatively large magnitude of the effect from the competing states
needs to be interpreted with caution, since it clearly, as I will show in more details
later, depends on the methods I adopt to define the weighing schemes.
As far as the control variables are concerned, the lagged dependent variable has
a positive and significant coefficient, indicating high persistence of the expenditure
policies. A positive and significant effect from the competitors’ weighted public
input expenditure provides evidence on the existence of strategic interaction among
states’ public input expenditure which in turn is the fundamental assumption of this
study. Real GDP per capita is negative and significant in all four models, suggesting
that a state with higher income level in the past period may care more about
people’s well-being, and so spend more on welfare expenditures.42 Openness has
positive but not significant effect. While the short-term fiscal position, measured by
the budget surplus, has negative but mostly insignificant effect, higher public debt
41I assume the estimated coefficient of MTRE taking a value of 0.05; and note that the mean value
of public input expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure for all states amounts to 29.4% (see
Table 3).
42One may argue that real GDP per capita is highly correlated with the measurement of heteroge-
neous region. But I believe that the former mostly captures the wealth level of the state in current
period, while the latter captures a greater difference in many aspects of the two types of regions at
the beginning period. As a matter of fact, dropping real GDP per capita from the regressions does
not affect my main results. These results are not reported in the paper, but they are available upon
requested.
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capturing the effect of long-term fiscal position significantly reduces investments on
public input. As expected, densely populated states tend to spend higher
proportion of expenditures on productive items, though the estimates are only
statistically significant at the margin. This indicates a higher demand of public
input networks in these states. Moreover, the results also show that states have a
tendency to spend more on productive expenditure during election periods,43
though partisan affiliation does not reflect significantly different preferences over the
composition of public expenditure.
III.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to test for the robustness of the main results, I conduct sensitivity analysis
along two dimensions. First, I re-estimate the specifications based on a longer time
period covering 1995 to 2007, which includes additional observations from the new
settings of the equalization system. It is expected that the results should be largely
consistent with the main results, as the basic structure and mechanism of the
system have not been changed. Second, I utilize alternative definitions of the
weighting matrices to estimate specification (24). The rationale here is that the
results I obtained so far have been derived under specific assumptions with respect
to the weighting matrices. More specifically, the above three weighting schemes are
constructed in a way that fits the theoretical assumption regarding the competition
among two types of regions. This specific construction certainly has its own benefits
in exactly identifying the theoretical question but, in a broader sense and as in
related studies, the implications of the model may also be applied to any types of
the competing states. It therefore seems to be warranted to relax this assumption in
constructing the weighing schemes. To do so, I follow the existing literature to
reconstruct the above three weighting schemes (i.e., weight I, weight II, and weight
43These estimates are in general statistically significant in a one-tail test at the 10% level.
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III) by disregarding their types of initial endowments. That is, instead of defining
the competing states of state i as its opposite type of states, I simply use all the
states except state i itself. I denote these three additional weighting schemes as
weight IV, weight V, and weight VI, respectively. In addition, I also follow most of
the spatial econometrics literature to construct two more weighting matrices, which
accounts for both the geographic closeness between states and the differences in the
states’ size. More specifically, the typical elements for these two weights (denoted as
“weight VII” and “weight VIII”) are, wij =
cijpopjt∑
j 6=i cijpopjt
and wij =
dijpopjt∑
j 6=i dijpopjt
, where
cij is a border dummy which equals one when state i and j share a common border
and zero otherwise (with cii = 0); dij is the inverse distance between state i and j
(with dii = 0); and popjt denotes population size of state j in year t.
Tables 5 reports results obtained from estimations with data from 1995 to 2007.
As expected, the inclusion of more information gives qualitatively similar results to
those obtained before; and with more observations, the estimates for some control
variables including budget surplus, population density, and election become
statistically more significant. However, as noted earlier, the magnitudes of the
estimated coefficients for competing states’ MTRE are reduced by roughly a half in
two out of the three cases (see columns (2) and (3) in Table 5), even though the
magnitudes for the measurement of heterogeneous regions and the home state’s
MTRE remain relatively comparable. Table 6 documents the results obtained with
alternative weighting schemes. In all cases, the results are consistent with the main
ones, which provide further robust evidence on the role of initial endowments and
the equalization system in affecting the state’s expenditure policy. Similarly, these
results also repeat the caution message that the magnitude effect of the equalization
system, especially for the competing states’ MTRE, has to be interpreted carefully,
as it varies across different definitions of the weighting matrices.44
44As shown in Table 6, the estimated coefficient of MTRE ranges from -0.127 to -0.064, while the
corresponding value for the competing states’ MTRE ranges from 0.07 to 0.285.
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Table 5: Sensitivity Checks: Estimation Results with Alternative Time Period
Dependent variable: Iit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight I Weight II Weight III
Iit−1 0.388*** 0.546*** 0.611*** 0.538***
(2.90) (4.56) (4.34) (4.17)
I−it 1.076*** 0.951*** 1.224***
(4.37) (3.98) (4.99)
West 0.034*** 0.051*** 0.041*** 0.037**
(3.52) (3.12) (2.60) (2.16)
MTREit−1 -0.093*** -0.059** -0.048* -0.064***
(-3.56) (-2.24) (-1.87) (-2.66)
MTRE−it−1 0.145** 0.126** 0.295**
(2.13) (2.10) (2.21)
GDP per capita t− 1 -0.096*** -0.077*** -0.068*** -0.081***
(-4.23) (-5.27) (-4.17) (-4.66)
Openness t− 1 0.005 0.008 0.01 0.009
(0.27) (0.45) (0.65) (0.52)
Budget surplus t− 1 -0.149* -0.073 -0.092 -0.152*
(-1.82) (-0.74) (-0.96) (-1.73)
Public debt t− 1 -0.162*** -0.136*** -0.123*** -0.138***
(-3.86) (-4.82) (-3.70) (-4.14)
Population density t− 1 0.007** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(2.42) (3.14) (2.72) (3.19)
Election t− 1 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(2.08) (2.44) (2.19) (2.13)
Party affiliation t− 1 -0.002 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.001
(-0.44) (-0.08) -0.17 (-0.22)
Constant 1.212*** 0.483*** 0.423** 0.363*
(4.75) (2.67) (2.43) (1.84)
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 192 192 192 192
Number of states 16 16 16 16
Hansen test (p-value) 0.935 1.000 0.999 0.985
AR(1) (p-value) 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002
AR(2) (p-value) 0.636 0.289 0.457 0.212
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1995-2007. Models are esti-
mated by system GMM estimator. I−it andMTRE−it−1 are the weighted averages of
values of the competing states (the opposite type of states)’ public input expenditures
and marginal tax rate of equalization respectively. I−it is instrumented by weighted
real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted public
debt, and weighted population density. The lagged dependent variable is instru-
mented by higher-order lags (restricted to t − 3 to t − 4) of the dependent variable.
The remaining explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous and therefore
also included in the instrument matrix. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Sensitivity Checks: Estimation Results with Alternative Weighting Schemes
Dependent variable: Iit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weight IV Weight V Weight VI Weight VII Weight VIII
Iit−1 0.478*** 0.369* 0.451*** 0.429*** 0.669***
(2.74) (1.88) (2.59) (2.63) (6.99)
I−it 0.875*** 0.834*** 0.757** 0.576*** 0.320***
(3.93) (3.83) (2.39) (2.90) (3.61)
West 0.031** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.015***
(2.32) (2.63) (2.64) (3.06) (2.61)
MTREit−1 -0.064
† -0.091* -0.074* -0.083** -0.127**
(-1.51) (-1.80) (-1.77) (-1.98) (-2.18)
MTRE−it−1 0.285*** 0.183* 0.236* 0.070
† 0.156**
(2.61) (1.90) (1.83) (1.51) (2.03)
GDP per capita t− 1 -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.065***
(-3.24) (-3.30) (-3.34) (-3.65) (-3.24)
Openness t− 1 0.017 0.014 0.012 -0.008 0.024
(0.86) (0.60) (0.51) (-0.28) (1.44)
Budget surplus t− 1 -0.151 -0.180 -0.216* -0.299*** -0.209***
(-1.13) (-1.22) (-1.90) (-3.34) (-2.66)
Public debt t− 1 -0.142*** -0.150*** -0.144*** -0.111*** -0.058**
(-4.19) (-3.59) (-3.10) (-2.84) (-2.46)
Population density t− 1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008* 0.001
(1.01) (0.83) (1.04) (1.81) (0.29)
Election t− 1 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.08) (0.96) (0.54) (0.59) (0.53)
Party affiliation t− 1 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(-0.51) (-0.89) (-0.76) (-0.49) (-0.89)
Constant 0.523 0.803** 0.674* 0.817*** 0.623**
(1.42) (2.13) (1.82) (3.30) (2.40)
State fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144 144 144 144 144
Number of states 16 16 16 16 16
Hansen test (p-value) 0.99 0.986 0.882 0.325 0.322
AR(1) (p-value) 0.022 0.035 0.022 0.031 0.005
AR(2) (p-value) 0.777 0.643 0.717 0.964 0.946
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1995-2004. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. I−it and MTRE−it−1 are the weighted averages of values of the com-
peting states (all other states)’ public input expenditures and marginal tax rate of equalization
respectively. I−it is instrumented by weighted real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted
budget surplus, weighted public debt, and weighted population density. The lagged dependent
variable is instrumented by higher-order lags (restricted to t−3 to t−4) of the dependent variable.
The remaining explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous and therefore also included
in the instrument matrix. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. †
represent significance at the 10% level under one-tail test.
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III.6 Conclusion
The paper explores the potential role of an equalization transfer system in correcting
the distortion of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in initial
endowments. This distortion has been particularly claimed by C&T, arguing that
competition among these heterogeneous regions leads to a “one-sided” disciplining
effect on regional governments’ expenditure policies: only well-endowed regions end
up with more productive expenditure policies, while poorly-endowed counterparts do
the opposite. I add a conventional equalization system to C&T’s original model and
show how this “one-sided” disciplining effect can be corrected by the system with
desired parameter settings. In particular, it requires the central government to set a
relatively higher equalization degree for the well-endowed regions, which at the end
converts to generate a larger disincentive effect for the governments in these regions
to expand their tax base by choosing higher level of public input expenditure.
The basic predictions of the model are tested by the German equalization
system, which closely matches the model assumptions and identification needs.
Apart from the finding confirming the emergence of “one-sided” disciplining effect
among West and East German states, my estimations validate the prediction that
the equalization system exerts a significant role in affecting the states’ expenditure
behaviors–a result that can be utilized by the central government for its design of an
effective equalization system to tackle the regional divergent expenditure policies
driven by the regional heterogeneity of initial endowments.
These findings have significant policy relevance. As decentralization has been
widely implemented in many countries around the world, where heterogeneity in
natural resources, human capital, or infrastructure are largely observed across
different regions, there will be a need for rethinking some corrective policies from
the central government that can remedy the “one-sided” disciplining effect in order
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to avoid an even worse outcome of regional disparity. In this particular context,
there are many reasons why an equalization system might be favored. Beyond the
most usual argument in supporting this system to reduce regional disparities in
fiscal capacity and the additional reasoning in favoring its role in internalizing the
externality of tax competition as found in some recent literature, I supplement this
support by highlighting its role in balancing regional expenditure policies and so
contributing to long-run balanced regional development. In all, I present a different
point of view to that of C&T in the sense that, I believe decentralization may also
be able to achieve the goal of imposing discipline on local governments in
heterogeneous countries, where a well-designed fiscal equalization system shall play
an essential role for the success of the countries’ decentralization policy.
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Chapter IV
INTER-JURISDICTIONAL TAX COMPETITION IN CHINA
IV.1 Introduction
Explaining the “miracle” of China’s economic growth over the past three decades
remains a challenging task. Recent studies have emphasized the role of local
governments, essentially arguing that the main engine for growth has been a series
of institutional reforms during the transition process which created large fiscal and
political incentives for local governments to promote economic development and
eventually evolving into a fierce competition for foreign capital (Gordon and Li,
2011; Xu, 2011). Along with the rapid economic growth observed in this period, the
explosive boom in “economic development zones”,45 and the resulting losses of large
amounts of agricultural land is another phenomenon that has attracted a great deal
of attention in academic and policy circles (Cartier, 2001; Yang and Wang, 2008). A
natural question that followed was whether the booming in development zones were
related to the competing behaviors of local governments driven by the strong fiscal
and political incentives they faced? Many scholars contend this has been the case
(Xu, 2011; Zhang, 2011).
Since China is a unitary country with the central government setting uniform
statutory tax rates across all provinces, the standard tax competition theory
describing inter-jurisdictional competition through selecting tax rates does not
45See definition and more discussion on development zones in the next section.
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apply automatically in the Chinese context. However, the favorable policies in
development zones granted by the central government created high levels of
administrative discretion for local governments to manipulate the effective tax rate
faced by foreign investors locating in their jurisdictions, which, in turn, enabled
local governments to compete for foreign investment (Xu, 2011). More specifically,
local governments started to set up and use their own development zones as a
conduit to offer tax incentives (e.g., tax exemptions, tax breaks, and preferential tax
rates) to foreign investors.46 Consequently, the “development zone fever” emerged
as a showcase of inter-jurisdictional competition in China (Zhang, 2011).
Beyond this wide recognition, it is surprising to see that rigorous empirical
evidence in support of these competing patterns and, especially, an account of the
possible mechanisms through which this competition has been conducted are largely
missing in the literature.47 This paper contributes to the literature in several
significant ways. First, this paper is among the first to provide empirical evidence
on provincial tax competition for foreign investment in China. Second, the paper
provides evidence on the role played by the establishment of development zones as a
vehicle for conducting provincial tax competition in China. Third, the paper
employs two alternative methods to measure the average effect tax rate on foreign
investment which take into account the tax incentives enjoyed by foreign investors.
Lastly, based on the theoretical predictions derived in the tax competition
literature, the paper examines the impact of each province’s characteristics (i.e., size
and level of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors.
46See Zheng (2006) table 3 for a detailed list of the major preferential tax policies for foreign
capital investing in the development zones in China.
47Using Chinese provincial panel data for 1980-2004, Caldeira (2012) provides evidence on the
existence of public spending interactions among provinces by estimating a spatial econometric model.
In another recent paper, Agostini et al. (2010) examine the strategic interactions over the provision
of public projects among 86 villages in rural China, where village election has been launched to
increase the accountability of local officials in rural areas.
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Using a panel of 30 Chinese provinces for 1993-2007 and applying both dynamic
spatial lag specifications and structural models, I find that: (i) there is strong
evidence on a positive strategic tax interaction among provincial governments; (ii)
both province size and industrialization level have a positive effect on the tax rates
chosen by the provinces, with the effect from the former generally being less
significant; (iii) the introduction of development zones leads to significant reductions
of effective tax rates, which in turn successfully helps attract more foreign
investment; and (iv) more intensive use of development zones does not necessarily
lead to lower tax effective rates on foreign investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section IV.2 introduces the
institutional setup on China that induces provincial governments to compete with
each other; the particular mechanism through which the competition is actually
conducted; and the baseline hypotheses derived from the theoretical tax competition
literature to form the empirical identification strategy. Section IV.3 sets up the
empirical methodology and discusses the data. Section IV.4 presents the empirical
results. Finally, section IV.5 concludes.
IV.2 Institutional Background, Mechanism, and Hypotheses
IV.2.1 Institutional Background
A distinctive feature of China’s transition from a highly planned to a market
economy has been its success in fostering strong fiscal and political incentives for
local governments to promote local economic development (Gordon and Li, 2011;
Xu, 2011). This has been largely achieved by decentralizing the country’s fiscal
system while maintaining rather centralized political institutions.
56
Starting from the early 1980s, the previous fiscal system of “unified revenue
collection and unified spending” (tongshou tongzhi)48 was replaced by the so-called
“fiscal contracting system” (caizheng chengbao zhi), in which each province was
assigned an independent responsibility to collect tax revenues in its domain and was
entitled to retain a significant portion of the revenues–any residual “fiscal profits”–
after they fulfilled the pre-determined sharing schemes. Local officials were thus
motivated by the incentive contracts to promote local business development, which
eventually increased their residual “fiscal profits” (Oi, 1992). In the meantime,
administrative decentralization was also implemented to enhance the authorities of
local governments in appointing subordinate government officials, approving
investment, and allocating resources that could be used to attract foreign investors.
This extensive administrative and fiscal decentralization reinforced each other in a
way that facilitated the role of local governments in promoting economic
development and enhanced regional competition for mobile tax bases. In light of
this significant institutional transformation, some authors proceeded to label it as
“Chinese-style, fiscal federalism”, under which local governments played the
function of “market-preserving” by supporting local business development (Qian
and Weingast, 1997).
Nevertheless, after over a decade of the “fiscal contracting system”, the marked
declines in both the share of the central government revenues in total budgetary
revenues and the share of total budgetary revenues in GDP generated great concern
at the central government level. This finally led to the “tax sharing system” (TSS)
reform of 1994. This reform had the twin objectives of raising the central
government’s revenues and strengthening the control of the central government over
the fiscal system. With the TSS, all taxes were classified into three categories:
48This was a highly centralized fiscal system. Under this system, local governments were acting
as the agents for the central government to collect revenues and execute spending mandates. Local
governments just did not have their own budgets, and all revenues and expenditures were approved
by the central government.
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central taxes, local taxes, and shared taxes. Meanwhile, separate central (state) and
local tax administration bureaus were established. The state tax bureau was put in
charge of central and most of the shared taxes, while local tax bureaus were made
responsible for collecting local taxes. Although the introduction of the TSS was
successful in hardening the budget constraint of local governments, the fiscal
incentives for local governments to compete for outside capital– and so for economic
development – largely remained in place (Jin et al., 2005; Zheng, 2006; Zhang, 2011).
Despite the recentralization of revenue assignments in 1994, the assignment of
expenditure responsibilities remained virtually unchanged.49 As a consequence, local
officials experienced mounting fiscal pressures for financing their expenditure needs.
This added to the local incentives to support business development to increase local
and shared revenues. In order to cope, local officials also continued to look for
possibilities to raise revenues outside the budget system, mainly extra-budgetary
funds. Also via rent seeking and sometimes corrupt behavior, prosperous local
economies also yielded direct financial rewards for local officials, in the form of
fringe benefits, work-related travel expenses, and informal income (Zhang, 2011).
Beyond economic incentives, local officials also faced strong political incentives,
which helped explain the strong enthusiasm showed by local governments in
promoting the local economy (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). The political
incentives were mainly generated by the highly centralized political system in China
with strong top-down mandates and a homogeneous governance structure. Since
local government officials are appointed by the upper level government, the central
authorities maintain absolute control in deciding the promotion or dismissal of local
officials, based on criteria strongly associated with improved economic performance.
49See Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao (2010) for a detailed discussion of the expenditure assignment
in China.
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Trying stay ahead of the professional career ladder, local officials generated a system
of open “yardstick competition”.50
In sum, the institutional transformation and economic reform in China created
strong fiscal and political incentives for local governments to promote local growth,
which ultimately mutated into fierce competition among local officials for capital,
especially foreign capital.
IV.2.2 Mechanisms of Competition
Given the highly centralized tax legislation in China, a practical question is how the
fierce tax competition for foreign capital was actually conducted. I argue that a
significant part of this had to do with the economic development zone policy that
was launched by the central government in the late 1970s.
These zones, which have received different names, are special
government-designated areas that aim to attract foreign investment and the transfer
of foreign technology.51 The zones granted preferential tax treatment and other
benefits to foreign enterprises.52 These included a reduced corporate income tax
rate of 15% for foreign enterprises operating in the zones, compared to a rate of 33%
imposed on domestic investors; full tax exemption in the first two profit-making
years followed by a 50% reduction in tax liability during the three following years;
50See Xu (2011) for an excellent review. Li and Zhou (2005) provide empirical evidence that the
central government indeed employs promotion and termination of provincial governors to induce
provincial economic growth.
51In line with positioning and functions, they may be officially called economic development zones,
economic and technological development zones, new and high-tech industrial development zones,
industrial parks, exporting processing zones, bonded zones, border economic co-operative zones,
etc. The government made clear the targets of development zones as “construction primarily relies
on attracting and utilizing foreign capital; primary economics forms are Sino-foreign joint ventures
and partnerships as well as wholly foreign-owned enterprises” (Wang, 2013). Therefore, domestic
investors are not admitted to settle in these zones, only except a very limited amount of certain
types of domestic enterprises that settle in some specific types of development zones (e.g., domestic
high-tech enterprises in new and high-tech industrial development zones).
52In the literature, location-based tax incentives have been shown to be successful in attracting
more investment. For example, Hanson and Rohlin (2011) find that the federal Empowerment
Zone program in U.S. is responsible for attracting about 2.2 new establishments per 1,000 existing
establishments in the zone areas.
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and tariff exemption on imported materials. In addition, provincial governments
have discretion to offer further local tax incentives, for example, a full waiver of the
additional 3% local corporate income tax; reduced rates for the property tax, the
urban construction tax, and the tax for occupation of arable land. Furthermore,
provincial governments also use informal, often illegal approaches to further reduce
the effective tax rates faced by foreign investors. This typically takes place in the
form of illegally extending the tax exemption period, enlarging the eligibility of
foreign enterprises that can be admitted to the zones, negotiating “revenue loss”
contracts with enterprises to actually hide profits from central taxation, and
lowering tax collection effort (Zheng, 2006).53
In light of the large scope for discretion created by the development zones and
the successful experience in attracting foreign investment, provincial governments
quickly involved themselves in a tax competition game.54 After the first
development zone was approved in Dalian city in 1984, thousands of others were
rapidly established across the entire nation. By the end of 1997, 30 out of 31
provinces (excepting Tibet) in China had built up their own development zones.
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the emergence and intensity of development zones.
It shows the expansion of zones from the coastal areas to the central and western
areas and a tendency to cluster in relatively well developed regions. Although the
legal authority for establishing zones is only assigned to the central and provincial
governments,55 lower-level governments quickly recognize the effectiveness of this
53See Wang (2013) for more description on other non-tax preferential policies, including property
rights protection and land use policy, granted by the central government.
54There may be a concern that is generated by the relative extent of labor immobility. That is,
due to the household registration (i.e. Hukou) system in China, labor mobility across regions is
largely restricted; therefore, the expansion of development zones activies may reduce the economic
activities of domestic firms outside the zones, resulting in a reduction of tax base outside the zones
However, Wang (2013) provides quantitative evidence that the introduction of development zones
neither crowds-in nor crowds-out domestic investment.
55Although the establishment of national-level development zones is at the discretion of the cen-
tral government, provincial governments, indeed, exert an important role in influencing the central
government’s decision via their lobbying efforts. Thus, to some extent, national-level development
zones are also a reflection of the competition outcome of provincial governments.
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tool and also started to set up their own zones, looking for the approval of their
provincial governments. By one count, there were already 6,866 development zones
in China in 2003, with a seized land area amounting to 38.6 thousand square
kilometers, a figure that is 35% higher than the total urban build-up in China
(Zhang, 2011). To highlight the effectiveness of development zones as a tool for tax
competition for foreign capital, according to the calculation of the National
Development and Reform Commission of China in 2003, the average effective tax
rate for foreign enterprises inside development zones was approximately 11%, a
value that was 16.9% lower than for the enterprises outside the zones, which faced a
rate of 27.9%; total FDI located in 45 national-level development zones (out of 6,866
total development zones at all levels) was 10.3 billion USD, a value that was
equivalent to 19.3% of total FDI received in the whole nation in 2003.56
IV.2.3 Basic Hypotheses
In this subsection, I present a brief overview of the theoretical tax competition
literature to form the baseline structure for the empirical identification.
Recent theoretical studies in this area originate in the fundamental work of
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). These studies reach the current
“benchmark conclusion” for this literature that, inter-jurisdictional competition for
mobile tax bases leads to a tendency towards inefficiently low tax rates.57 This is so
because each jurisdiction faces an incentive to keep its tax rate low in an attempt to
preserve its tax base from flowing to other jurisdictions. In particular, when
individual jurisdiction is large relative to the economy, it is able to affect the net
56I also want to report the corresponding values for total FDI received in all development zones
and/or total FDI received in provincial-level development zones, however, these data are not avail-
able.
57Numerous subsequent works have extended and refined this view in a variety of directions (See
Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004, for excellent surveys of the tax competition literature).
Nevertheless, there are also a few others pointing out that in the presence of inter-jurisdictional
externalities, this benchmark result may not necessarily hold (see, for example, Pinto, 2007).
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Figure 3: Evolution of the Setup of Development Zones in China, 1984-2003
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return to capital in the economy by varying its tax rate; this in turn implies that
the impact of a jurisdiction’s choice of tax rate depends on the tax rates elsewhere.
Therefore, the optimal tax rate in one jurisdiction depends on the tax rates in other
jurisdictions, leading to the strategic interaction among jurisdictions [Hypothesis
1].58 Although theory shows that, depending on functional forms, this strategic
interaction can be either positive or negative; in almost all the related empirical
studies, a positive interaction has been found (e.g., Nelson, 2002; Brueckner, 2003;
Leprince et al., 2007).59
Hypothesis 1. A province’s optimal tax rate on foreign investment strategically
interacts with those of the other provinces.
This early tax competition literature provides valuable insights into the nature
of competition among governments. However, it relies heavily on the assumption
that all jurisdictions are identical and therefore choose the same tax rate. This
assumption hides the potential for inter-governmental conflict and so the model fails
to explain the actual asymmetric policy responses of governments as it is observed
in some regions of the world.60 Particularly, this assumption may not hold given the
presence of exogenous asymmetries among the competing jurisdictions. A closer
look at this issue has brought scholars’ attention to the role that jurisdictional size
may play in setting capital tax rates. Bucovetsky (1991); Wilson (1991) and
Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007) argue that in equilibrium a small jurisdiction tends
58Ideally, testing the existence of strategic interaction among jurisdictions is not sufficient to fully
validate the emergence of tax competition, as this strategic interaction may also arise through other
possible channels, such as yardstick competition or simply policy diffusion. The distinction among
the various possible channels to explain the detected strategic interaction in tax rates remains a
difficult task in the literature. The tax competition avenue appears to be the most commonly
accepted explanation.
59Noticeable exceptions include Chirinko and Wilson (2011) and Parchet (2012). Both of these
papers find a negative strategic interaction in tax rates among U.S. states and Swiss municipalities,
respectively. Rork (2003) concludes that the slope of tax reaction functions depends on the mobility
of the tax base.
60For instance, despite the increasing mobility of capital and competitive pressure on the govern-
ments in the European Union, the variation of effective average tax rates among members remains
high, ranging from 8.8% in Bulgaria to 35.5% in Germany in 2007 (Elschner and Vanborren, 2009).
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to set a lower tax rate than a large jurisdiction [Hypothesis 2], since the former faces
a higher elasticity of capital supply.61
Hypothesis 2. Smaller size provinces tend to set lower tax rate on foreign
investment than larger size provinces.
A separate literature argues that asymmetric policy responses may also emerge
as a consequence of agglomeration economies. Under different game settings, Kind
et al. (2000); Ludema and Wooton (2000), and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) reach
a similar conclusion that industrial concentration in core regions generates
“agglomeration rents” for the firms located in these regions, which in turn provides
these regions an ability to extract some of these rents through higher taxation62
[Hypothesis 3]. Furthermore, Zissimos and Wooders (2008) show that even without
agglomeration economies, variation across firms in their requirements for public
goods yields the asymmetric outcome that the core regions may set a higher tax
rate and provide a higher level of public infrastructure than the periphery regions.
This is because the core regions with more efficient governments offer
more-than-proportional increases in the level of public good production, which in
turn reduces the production costs of the firms, making it optimal for some of them
to pay higher taxes. Applying this hypothesis to China, I can expect the validation
of Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3. Provinces with higher level of industrialization tend to set higher
tax rates on foreign investment than provinces with lower level of industrialization.
61Country size is measured in these studies by the population. However, this result is shown to be
quite consistent with the other measures of country size. For example, Marceau et al. (2010) model
country size by the stocks of immobile capital, and obtain a similar result.
62Baldwin and Krugman (2004) derive this result under a sequential game setting assuming the
more-developed region assumes the leader role. Therefore, a confirmation of Hypothesis 3 may also
suggest the emergence of a Stackelberg type game in reality.
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IV.3 Empirical Methodology and Data
My main empirical strategy is (i) to provide evidence on the existence of provincial
tax competition in China along with the validation of the three basic hypotheses
stated in the previous section; and (ii) to shed some light on the mechanism through
which tax competition is actually conducted in the Chinese context. I first follow
the existing literature setting up a dynamic spatial lag model to identify the
competing behaviors of provinces, and then discuss a structural model as a way to
unveil the mechanism for competition I laid out in the previous section. Before
proceeding, I need to make two explicit assumptions. First, given that the statutory
tax rate is fixed across provinces in China, I assume that the relevant tax rate is the
average effective tax rate (AETR). Second, in line with the existence of a multilevel
local government structure in China, I refer to the provincial government as a single
entity that represents and captures all the competing behaviors of subnational
governments in that particular province. This is justified because under China’s
highly centralized political system, provincial governments maintain absolute powers
in appointing local officials and deciding major local activities in their domains. In
addition, besides the central government, the authority for establishing development
zones is only legally assigned to provincial governments, which are also responsible
for approving any setups of development zones at the sub-provincial level.63
63Therefore, horizontal competition among sub-provincial governments should not be an issue,
since they act as agents of provincial governments at the local level, and so their behaviors, at most,
are only the reflections of provincial governments’ policies. On the other hand, vertical competition
between provincial and sub-provincial governments is unlikely to exist in the Chinese context, given
what as I just described that provincial governments maintain absolute top-down control within the
province.
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IV.3.1 Identification of Provincial Tax Competition
IV.3.1.1 Specification
Tax competition theory suggests that τit, the AETR of province i in year t, is a
reaction function of the tax rates chosen by its neighboring provinces. This gives us
a spatial lag specification in the most general form that has been widely employed
in the previous empirical research on tax competition (e.g., Devereux et al., 2008;
Jacobs et al., 2010; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012).
τit = λτit−1 + δ
∑
j 6=i
wijτjt + γpopit−1 + θindustit−1 +Xit−1β + ηi + ttt + εit (26)
where τit−1 is a one period time-lagged dependent variable, which is included to
account for the high degree of persistence in tax policies;
∑
j 6=iwijτjt denotes the
mean of the AETRs of the provinces other than province i in year t, weighted by
the predetermined weights (row-normalized) wi1, ..., wiN ,
64 and on the basis of
Hypothesis 1, I predict a nonzero sloped reaction function, i.e., δ 6= 0; popit−1 is the
population size of province i in year t− 1; it is included to capture the effect of
province size; industit−1 is my measure of industrialization level of a province and
following Zhang et al. (2004), it is measured as the ratio of non-agricultural GDP to
agricultural GDP of province i in year t− 1.65 As summarized in Hypothesis 2 and
3, both the size and industrialization level of a province are viewed as generating
asymmetric tax policy responses among the provinces, and so I expect γ > 0 and
θ > 0. Both variables are lagged one period to avoid the potential endogeneity of
these variables. Furthermore, the specification includes state fixed effects (ηi) to
64Note that my focus is on competition among Chinese provinces, and therefore I do not take into
account the potential competition of those provinces near international borders with neighboring
countries. Geys and Osterloh (2013) point out the possibility of this kind of border effect.
65For robustness checks, I also use the share of non-agricultural GDP in total GDP as the mea-
surement of industrialization level. The results are largely unchanged.
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control for unobserved heterogeneity across provinces and also a linear time trend
(ttt); εit is an idiosyncratic error term.
66
With the control variables Xit−1 I seek to capture the main determinants of tax
rates based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature. This leads to the
inclusion of real GDP per capita, openness, government consumption, urban
population share, geographical dummy variables, and tax reform dummy variable.
Real GDP per capita serves as a measure of income; higher incomes are generally
related to stronger demand for public services which may ultimately affect a
province’s choice of tax policies. Openness, measured by the ratio of imports plus
exports to GDP, aims to capture the exposure of a province to trade and
competition for capital. Government consumption as a percentage of GDP is
included to account for the revenue need of the government. The proportion of
urban population is a proxy for the demographic features of a province that may
also influence government’s preference for tax policies.67 In addition, given the fact
that many privileged policies were granted to the coastal provinces at the beginning
of China’s economic reforms in 1978, I include a geographical dummy variable,
which takes the value 1 if the province is located in coastal region and 0 otherwise.
Meanwhile, in order to account for the possible systematic difference of the tax
policies before and after the critical TSS reform in 1994, I also include a post-reform
dummy variable that equals 1 for the post-reform period and 0 otherwise. Finally,
all control variables, excepting the dummy variables, are lagged by one period to
avoid any endogeneity bias.
66Note that the error term εit may also be modeled as a spatial process. However, under my
system GMM estimation framework (as elaborated below), the possible presence of spatial error
dependence would not bias my estimate of the spatial parameter δ in specification (26). Since
neighbors’ tax rates are instrumented, the estimate of δ should not be affected by the potential
spatial auto-correlation in the error term εit (see for example, Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Revelli,
2001; Agostini et al., 2010).
67The shares of young and elderly population may be alternatively better proxies for the demo-
graphic features of a province. Unfortunately, annual data for these variables are not available at
the provincial level.
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Weighting matrices. An important decision on the estimation of the above
spatial lag models concerns the choice of the weighting matrix. The standard
practice in the spatial econometrics literature is to assume that geographically
closer jurisdictions interact more strongly with each other. This leads to two
common methods for defining the weights. The first is a contiguity matrix, where a
value of 1 is assigned if two jurisdictions share the same border and 0 otherwise.
The other alternative is to use the inverse distances between the two jurisdictions as
weights. As argued in some of the recent empirical tax competition literature,
however, in the case of competition for mobile capital, it is very likely that capital
will go much beyond first order neighbors, which renders the contiguity method less
useful (Devereux et al., 2008; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). Beyond the
geographical criterion, it has been suggested that jurisdictions may regard as
neighbors other jurisdictions that are similar to them economically and so compete
for the same types of firms or the same type of capital (Case et al., 1993). In order
to account for these considerations, I construct a benchmark weighting matrix that
incorporates both the physical distance between jurisdictions and the similarity of
economy-size between jurisdictions. More specifically, the typical element of the
weighing matrix is
wij ≡


sijdij
∑N
j=1 sijdij
for i 6= j
0 for i = j
where sij is the inverse of the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita
between provinces i and j; dij is the inverse of distance between provinces i and j.
With these weights, a province that has a small difference in economy-size and is
closer in geographic space would receive a higher weight. In order to check the
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sensitivity of the results, I also employ an alternative weighing matrix that is purely
based on the similarity of economy-size.68
IV.3.1.2 Estimation
Dynamics. In order to estimate specification (26) unbiasedly and efficiently, two
critical endogeneity issues need to be addressed. First, the lagged dependent
variable is endogenous since it is correlated with the state fixed effect in the
composite error term (ηi + εit), which renders biased and inconsistent results if OLS
or fixed effect estimators are applied. Second, the tax policies of competitors (the
spatial lag variable) enter the specifications contemporaneously, so that the
competitors’ tax policies are endogenous and correlated with the error term (εit)
and OLS would yield a biased estimate of parameter δ (Anselin, 1988).69
To circumvent both endogeneity problems, I employ the system GMM estimator
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), one that has been used quite often in the
recent studies on tax competition with dynamic features (Ghinamo et al., 2010;
Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). This estimator combines the moment conditions
from both the first-differenced equation of the estimating equation and the
estimating equation in levels, and then estimates the parameters by GMM. In
dealing with the endogenous variables, the system GMM estimator uses lagged
levels to instrument the endogenous differences and lagged first differences to
68Instead of using the difference in GDP per capita to capture the similarity among the provinces,
I also tried the difference in the level of industrialization. I obtained quite similar results and so
they are not reported in the paper. But all results are available upon request.
69This second endogeneity is a typical issue in the spatial econometrics literature. Two conven-
tional approaches for getting consistent estimates of the spatial parameter are suggested in the
literature. The first approach is to use instrumental variables (Anselin, 1988), where the use of
the weighted average of competitors’ exogenous or control variables as instruments are typically
suggested (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Kelejian and Robinson, 1993). An alternative approach is to
rely on the maximum likelihood approach. Under this method, a non-linear reduced form for the
original equation is computed by inverting the system. A non-linear optimization routine is then
used to estimate the spatial parameter. See Brueckner (2003) for more discussion. Although both
approaches yield consistent estimates of the spatial parameter, the later method is generally more
challenging in computation.
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instrument levels. In addition, following the standard spatial econometrics literature
(Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Kelejian and Robinson, 1993), I also use as additional
exogenous instruments for the spatial lag variable the competitors’ weighted
averages of the explanatory variables, including weighted real GDP per capita,
weighted openness, weighted government consumption as percentage of GDP, and
weighted proportion of urban population.70
The overall validity of the instruments used in the regressions as well as the
serial correlation in the residuals are evaluated by the Hansen test (or
overidentifying restriction test) and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test, respectively.
Both statistics are necessary to confirm the validity of the instruments used.
Finally, given my small sample size and the significant amount of additional
instruments introduced, I collapse the instrument matrix in the estimation in order
to avoid the problem of “too many instruments” discussed in Roodman (2009a).71
Time effects. Ideally one would also include time dummies in the specification
(26) to prevent cross-province contemporaneous correlation. However, doing so
would generate two problems in my context. Due to the large amount of
instruments created by the system GMM estimator together with the external
instruments, adding time dummies to my relatively small sample would lead to too
many instruments which may weaken the Hansen test and overfit the endogenous
variables (Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2009b). Additionally, Devereux et al. (2008)
and Klemm and Van Parys (2012) point out that the inclusion of time dummies in a
model with spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity issue among
the spatial lag variables and the time dummies,72 which makes it hard to identify
the true impact of each variable. Therefore, following the suggestion by Devereux
70The weights are constructed in the same way as discussed previously.
71A finite sample size with too many instruments may weaken the Hansen test to the point where
it generates implausibly good p values of 1.000 (Bowsher, 2002).
72The reason here is that the inclusion of time dummies is equivalent to adding the average value
of the dependent variable in each year, which by its nature is highly correlated with the spatial lag
variables.
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et al. (2008); Caldeira (2012) and Klemm and Van Parys (2012), I add a linear time
trend variable which captures a common trend for all states, instead of using time
dummies.
IV.3.2 Development Zones as a Mechanism of Competition
In section IV.2, I argued that one of the main mechanisms for provincial
governments to carry tax competition to attract foreign investment is through the
establishment of development zones. To shed some light on this issue, I have to
identify the extent to which the establishment of development zones reduces the
AETR on foreign investment, and how this reduction of effective rates finally affects
the foreign investment actually received by the provinces.
IV.3.2.1 Specification
I estimate the following structural specifications


FDIit = λτit + Z1it−1β1 + η1i + ν1t + ε1it
τit = ρdit + δ
∑
j 6=iwijτjt + Z2it−1β2 + η2i + ν2t + ε2it
(27)
to establish the linkage running from the introduction of a development zone (dit) to
a lower level of AETR (τit), and then to a higher level of foreign direct investment
(FDI) received by the provinces (FDIit). In the system equations (27), FDIit is
measured as the ratio of inward FDI flow to GDP of province i in year t; dit is the
measure capturing the effect of development zones of province i in year t,73 and it
includes the following three indexes: a dummy variable for the existence of
development zones (dum devit), the accumulated number of development zones
(dev numit), and the per capita accumulated land area occupied by the
73Given my focus on provincial tax competition, all development zones data refers to development
zones set up by provincial governments only.
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development zones (dev landit); while the first index aims to identify whether the
introduction of development zones leads to an expected reduction of AETR, the last
two indexes go a step further to explore whether the intensity of development zones
within the provinces would have a second impact on the AETR; η1i and η2i are
province-specific fixed effects capturing the unobserved heterogeneity across
provinces that are constant over time; and ν1t and ν2t are year dummies capturing
the contemporaneous correlation among provinces.
In the FDI specification, besides τit, which captures the effect of tax rate on
foreign investment, I add a set of control variables (Z1it−1) similar to those in the
tax rate equation, including real GDP per capita, openness, government
consumption as a percentage of GDP, and share of urban population. In addition, I
include a geographical dummy variable and a post-reform dummy variable to
capture the potential impacts of geographical characteristics and institutional
changes. The control variables in the tax rate specification, Z2it−1, cover the whole
list of variables I used in the previous subsection, including province size and
industrialization level. Finally, all control variables, with the exception of dummy
variables, are lagged by one period to avoid any bias arising from the possible joint
determination of these variables and the dependent variable.
IV.3.2.2 Estimation
Estimation of the system equations (27) requires an effective methodology to tackle
several econometric issues simultaneously. First, appearance of the dependent
variable τit on the RHS in the FDI specification creates the usual endogeneity
problem in the estimation of simultaneous equations, which renders OLS estimators
biased. However, under the framework of 2SLS estimation, the system is identified
as not all explanatory variables in the tax rate equation are determinants of FDI
location–those additional controls implicitly serve as instruments for the endogenous
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tax rate variable in the FDI equation. Second, the spatial lag variable on the RHS
in the tax rate equation generates the same endogeneity issue as the one I faced
before; I therefore use the same method to cope with it. That is, I use the
competitors’ weighted average of explanatory variables as additional exogenous
instruments for the spatial lag variable. Finally, the possible omitted variables
would affect both equations, leading to inefficiency caused by the possible
correlation of the error terms ε1it and ε2it in the system. Thus I incorporate the
seemingly unrelated regression model to extend the 2SLS to a 3SLS model in order
to address the endogeneity problem and improve estimation efficiency.
IV.3.3 Data
The panel dataset covers 30 provinces over the period 1993-2007. Tibet is not
included due to the lack of data availability. Selection of the observation period is
based on data availability for the measure of AETR. Year 1993 is the earliest I can
get access to foreign tax revenue data; while year 2007 is the last the Chinese
statistical office reports the foreign tax revenue data separately. With China’s new
Corporate Income Tax Law that took effect on January 1 2008, there is a unified
corporate income tax regime for foreign and domestic enterprises. The data
definitions, sources and summary statistics are presented in Table 7.
I measure AETR as the actual tax revenue from foreign investors relative to the
relevant tax base. In particular, two indexes are constructed. The primary one
(denoted as AETR1) is defined as the ratio of total foreign tax revenues (shewai
shuizhou zong’e) to total investment of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The
alternative index (denoted as AETR2), which is employed for robustness checks, is
defined as the ratio of total foreign tax revenues to total registered capital (zhuce
ziben) of FIEs. The common numerator in both measures reflects the overall
effective tax burden on foreign investment and should therefore be preferred to
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definitions based on total income tax revenues of FIEs only.74 These measures of
AETR follow the method of Mendoza et al. (1994) that has been widely used in
macroeconomic analysis and some recent empirical studies of tax competition (e.g.,
Winner, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2010). They are also deemed as the most suitable
measures of effective tax rate in my context for three reasons.75 First, the AETR
captures both relevant income and non-income taxes imposed on foreign investment,
as well as all components determining the tax base, like legal and/or illegal
deductions, exemptions, tax credits and the enforcement of tax rules. All these
factors serve as important tools for provincial tax competition. Second, the AETR
is an aggregate measure of tax burden that fits well with the assumption of a
representative agent underlying most tax competition models. Third, since the
AETR is a backward-looking measure of an average effective rate, it is appropriate
for measuring distributional burdens, and so it should be the relevant tax measure if
jurisdictions compete for discrete location of foreign investment (Devereux and
Griffith, 2003). Data for calculating the AETRs are extracted from various issues of
the Tax Yearbook of China.
Information on the established development zones at the national and provincial
levels is provided in a file compiled and published by the National Development and
Reform Commission of China (NDRCC) with the assistance of the Ministry of Land
and Resources and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in 2006.
74This is because, as I elaborated in the previous sections, offering preferential income tax rates or
reductions to foreign investors is not the only tool for provincial governments to compete with each
other. Exerting different degrees of tax enforcements on other indirect taxes and fees such as VAT,
local business tax, land usage tax, and even individual income tax can also be important means for
competition. According to my calculation, FIEs income tax revenue only accounts for a small share
of total tax revenue collected from FIEs, ranging from 8.9% in year 1993 to 19.2% in year 2006.
75Note that these measures of AETR also suffer from some concerns. Among them one important
concern is that the AETR may vary considerably according to the underlying economic conditions
in a province, even if there is no change in tax regimes (Devereux et al., 2008). This issue can be
addressed if some alternative measures of AETR, as the ones proposed by Devereux and Griffith
(2003) that are based on forward-looking concepts, are employed. Even though, given data avail-
ability, I am not able to create such kinds of tax measures as robustness check; I believe, this issue
should not be significant since provincial fixed effects in the estimations will be able to pick up some
of these effects.
75
This file contains detailed information on individual development zones including
year of establishment, land area occupied, leading industry it belongs to, and
others.76 I then aggregate the information from individual to provincial level for
estimation purposes.77
Data for all other variables are obtained from various issues of China Statistical
Yearbook and China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008.
IV.4 Empirical Results
I now turn to the discussion of the estimation results. Evidence of provincial tax
competition along with testing results for the three hypotheses laid out in section
IV.2 are documented in subsection IV.4.1.1. The structural estimation results
supporting the role of development zones as a mechanism for competition are
presented in subsection IV.4.1.2.
IV.4.1 Provincial Tax Competition
IV.4.1.1 Main results
Specification (26) is estimated using the system GMM method, along with robust
and finite sample corrected standard errors. The F-statistics for first stage
regression models, the Hansen test, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test are
reported at the bottom of each table, indicating the validity of the instruments used.
Based on both measures of AETR, Table 8 reports the main results from
estimations controlling and not for the time trend. For all four regressions, I find a
statistically significant coefficient for the competitors’ weighted AETRs in line with
Hypothesis 1 that a province’s tax rate reacts strategically to tax rates in other
76The file is in the title of “Directory of China Development Zone Audit An-
nouncement (zhongguo kaifaqu shenhe gonggao)”, which is freely available online at
http://www1.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbgg/2007gonggao/W020070406535176330304.pdf/.
77Note that the data on the development zones are available from 1984 to 2006. So whenever the
development zone variables enter the specifications, the estimation period is up to 2006.
76
provinces. A positive value of this coefficient further confirms a general finding in
the relevant literature to the point that a province raises (cuts) its own AETR if
other provinces raise (reduce) their AETRs. The magnitudes of the coefficients,
varying across the definitions of AETR and model specifications, range from 0.51 to
0.87. It shows that the inclusion of time trend tends to reduce the extent of
strategic interaction among provinces. Intuitively, this may suggest that the changes
of tax rates among different provinces are partially systematic and so the inclusion
of a common time trend can pick up this effect and lead to a smaller strategic
interaction. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients become smaller when the
alternative measure of AETR is used, which is not surprising given that AETR2 is a
less accurate measure of effective tax rate. This measure uses total registered
capital of FIEs as the denominator, which only reflects the capital endowment of
the enterprises at the time of registration and may not vary significantly over time.
Nevertheless, all four coefficients of weighted AETRs are smaller than one, which
ensures the stationarity of the spatial lag model. Province size enters the model
with a positive sign—a result that is consistent with Hypothesis 2, though the
coefficients are only statistically significant when not controlling for the time trend.
This may again suggest that a common trend of population changes across
provinces explains a larger share of the variation of population size over time.78
Turning to Hypothesis 3, the results reveal supporting evidence by showing a
positive and significant effect of the province’s industrialization level, though this
effect is relatively small in magnitude.
For the control variables, the lagged dependent variable has a positive and
significant coefficient, indicating higher persistence of the tax policies. Government
consumption as a percentage of GDP has negative and significant coefficients in
general, suggesting that with higher demand for revenues, a lower effective tax rate
78This result is consistent with Jacobs et al. (2010), which also find an insignificant effect of states’
population size on the U.S. states’ tax settings in a dynamic estimation framework.
77
Table 8: Provincial Tax Competition: Main Results
Dependent variable Avg eff tax rate Avg eff tax rate
(AETR1) (AETR2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg eff tax rate t− 1 0.237** 0.219* 0.556*** 0.543***
(1.96) (1.88) (3.47) (3.78)
Weighted avg eff tax rate 0.869*** 0.704*** 0.608*** 0.505**
of neighbors (7.21) (3.88) (3.23) (2.26)
Population t− 1 (pop) 0.003† 0.001 0.005* 0.003
(1.42) (0.44) (1.81) (1.09)
Industrialization t− 1 (indust) 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006** 0.007**
(3.01) (2.21) (2.19) (2.53)
Per capita GDP t− 1 (gdppc) -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.92) (-0.59) (-1.44) (-0.81)
Proportion of urban population -0.004 -0.008 -0.000 -0.012
t− 1 (urban) (-0.15) (-0.31) (-0.02) (-0.40)
Openness t− 1 (open) -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.005
(-0.35) (0.66) (-0.66) (-0.42)
Government consumption as % -0.326*** -0.279*** -0.284** -0.300***
of GDP t− 1 (govcon) (-4.46) (-2.98) (-2.52) (-2.64)
Reform dummy (dum reform) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.49) (-0.64) (-0.59) (-0.24)
Coastal dummy (dum coastal) -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(-1.03) (-0.81) (0.35) (0.30)
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 416 416 416 416
First stage F-statistics 45.58 43.29 60.89 57.13
Hansen test (p-value) 0.310 0.265 0.342 0.235
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0183 0.0357 0.175 0.186
AR(2) (p-value) 0.409 0.327 0.286 0.284
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1993-2007. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. †
represents significance at the 10% level under one-tail test.
78
is chosen in order to attract more tax base. Other control variables are generally
not statistically significant.
IV.4.1.2 Robustness
In order to test for the robustness of the basic results, I conduct sensitivity analysis
along three dimensions. First, I utilize an alternative specification to control for the
time fixed effects. As noted earlier, the inclusion of time fixed effects in the dynamic
specification (26) would weaken the Hansen test and overfit endogenous variables in
the estimation. However, omitting the time fixed effects may generate another
source of bias–a common spatial shock. That is, the identified strategic interaction
over tax rates may also be interpreted as a result from a common spatial shock
across all provinces. To address this possibility, I drop the lagged dependent
variable τit−1 in specification (26) to estimate a static tax reaction function and
controlling for both province fixed effects and time fixed effects. The weighted
AETRs is again treated as an endogenous variable and instrumented by the same
set of instruments I used before. Second, I employ an alternative weighting matrix
that is purely based on the similarity of economy-size among provinces to
characterize the competition pattern. Finally, I re-estimate specification (26) with a
reduced sample size that excludes the four province-level municipalities and other
provinces in the coastal region.79 The objective is to examine the strategic
interaction among relatively small provinces in economy-size, where all
sub-provincial governments are atomistic from the viewpoint of the province.
Presence of strategic interaction among these provinces would confirm that, at least
partially, my main results have not been driven by any possible vertical competition
between provincial governments and sub-provincial governments–even though, in
theory, I have explicitly ruled out this possibility in the Chinese context.
79These include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan,
Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, and Zhejiang.
79
Table 9 presents the robustness estimation results, which are highly consistent
and robust with the main ones. They confirm the existence of a positive and
significant strategic interaction over tax rates among provinces. On the effects of
provincial characteristics, province size remains statistically insignificant when
controlling for time trend or time fixed effects. Industrialization level of a province
has the expected effect, though it turns to be statistically insignificant in the
estimations with a reduced sample size–in large part due to the elimination of
information from provinces with higher level of industrialization in the coastal
region.
IV.4.2 The Role of Development Zones
IV.4.2.1 Main results
Table 10 presents the estimation results for the structural specifications (27) using
3SLS approach. The dependent variables are noted on the top of each column.
dum devit is used to examine the impact of the introduction of development zones.
In light of the time it takes from the initial establishment of zones to attract foreign
investment and to result in tax revenues, it is reasonable to expect more than one
year lag. I experiment with a lag of up to 5 years to capture this effect. As shown in
Table 10, in all FDI equations, the AETR is always negative and significant,
confirming the traditional expectations. In all the tax rate equations, the
introduction of development zones is found to be negatively associated with the
AETR on foreign investment, though as expected, a lagged effect of two to five
years is detected. Thus, I find support for a channel running from the introduction
to development zone to a lower AETR to a higher level of FDI.
On top of the negative impact of development zones on the AETR, I ask
whether the intensity of development zones plays a further role in reducing the
effective tax rates faced by foreign investors. To do so, I add the explanatory
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variables dev numit and dev landit, the intensity of development zones, and
re-estimate the models. The results are summarized in Table 11; the results for the
control variables are not reported to save space. I find a statistically insignificant
coefficient for the measure of intensity of development zones. Establishing more
development zones or enlarging their sizes does not appear to further contribute to
lower AETRs. This may be because the scope of manipulation and discretion for
local authorities cannot be changed significantly with the changes of development
zones; a further expansion of zones can just be used to contain a larger amount of
FDI. Note finally that the coefficients for province size are positive and statistically
significant in the tax rate equations, which gives support to Hypothesis 2.
IV.4.2.2 Robustness
I run several additional estimations to check the robustness of my results. I
re-estimate the structural specifications by using both the alternative measure of
AETR (AETR2) and the alternative definition of weighting scheme respectively. In
addition, instead of measuring the FDI flows as a percentage of GDP, I also try to
measure it as the log of per capita FDI received by each province. Overall, I find
consistent evidence in supporting the main argument. The results are not reported
for space reasons.
Lastly, given my interest in validating development zones as an important
conduit for provincial governments to manipulate effective tax rates and so involving
a tax competition game, I also test for the strategic interaction over development
zones among provinces directly. If a positive interaction is found, that would give us
further robust evidence on the role of development zones. I perform this analysis by
modifying specification (26) to replace the tax rate variables (τit) with the
development zones variables (dev numit and dev landit), as the strategic variables
in the estimations. The results, as reported in Table 12, are comparable with each
82
other. They confirm that regardless of the measurement of development zones,
either in its number (dev numit) or its size (dev landit), there exists a positive and
significant strategic interaction among provinces. The estimated coefficients take
values around 0.5-0.6, indicating a relatively strong strategic interaction over the
setup of development zones among provinces. The coefficients for the provincial
characteristics are in general statistically insignificant, which is not surprising given
their weak economic significance in the setting up of development zones.
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Table 12: Development Zones as a Mechanism of Competition: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable Development zone Development zone
numbers (dev num) areas (dev land)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Development zone numbers t− 1 0.785*** 0.826***
(7.88) (7.06)
Weighted development zone 0.653*** 0.615***
numbers of neighbors (5.37) (4.56)
Development zone areas t− 1 0.854*** 0.872***
(10.43) (9.56)
Weighted development zone 0.526*** 0.518***
areas of neighbors (4.13) (3.12)
Population t− 1 (pop) 0.000 -0.000 -0.286 -0.026
(0.08) (-0.13) (-0.54) (-0.05)
Industrialization t− 1 (indust) 0.000 0.001 1.715* 1.914**
(0.00) (0.22) (1.74) (1.96)
Per capita GDP t− 1 (gdppc) -0.003 -0.003 -1.103 -1.566
(-0.93) (-0.51) (-0.84) (-0.59)
Proportion of urban population -0.000 -0.002 -6.704 -6.012
t− 1 (urban) (-0.01) (-0.20) (-1.11) (-0.83)
Openness t− 1 (open) 0.001 0.002 0.470 0.002
(0.42) (0.65) (0.35) (0.00)
Government consumption as % -0.139* -0.140** -71.769 -51.735
of GDP t− 1 (govcon) (-1.73) (-2.16) (-1.08) (-0.68)
Reform dummy (dum reform) -0.006*** -0.004*** -3.394*** -3.018***
(-4.62) (-4.99) (-3.53) (-3.25)
Coastal dummy (dum coastal) -0.001 -0.002 -1.291 -0.768
(-0.58) (-0.53) (-1.46) (-0.64)
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 639 639 639 639
First stage F-statistics 233.96 217.02 306.96 285.76
Hansen test (p-value) 0.584 0.705 0.561 0.530
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0652 0.0643 0.0508 0.0503
AR(2) (p-value) 0.518 0.500 0.239 0.243
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1984-2006. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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IV.5 Conclusion
This paper aims to answer two important questions on the Chinese economy. First,
does provincial tax competition for foreign capital exist? A positive certain answer
would provide support for the prevalent view of the role of local governments as one
of the main engines for China’s rapid economic growth over the past thirty years.
Second, if the answer to first question is “yes”, then the next important question is
how is this competition conducted in the Chinese context where there is highly
centralized tax system?
In answering the first question, I calculate for each province the AETR on
foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign
investors for the period 1993-2007 covering 30 provinces. My estimation results from
dynamic spatial lag models provide strong evidence in support of the existence of
positively strategic tax interactions among provincial governments in China. In line
with the theoretical hypotheses, the results highlight the economic significance of a
province’ spatial characteristics in determining its choice of AETR. In particular,
provinces with a higher level of industrialization tend to select a higher level of tax
rate than provinces with a lower level of industrialization. Although, in theory,
larger provinces are predicted to choose higher tax rates, my results only provide
week support for this argument.
The answer to the second question lies on the observation of a booming trend in
development zones that took place contemporaneously with China’s rapid economic
growth. Given the endorsed favorable tax policies and the large local administrative
discretion granted by the central government to the development zones, I explore
the establishment of development zones as a conduit for provincial tax competition.
The estimation results from the structural models confirm this conjecture to the
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extent that the introduction of development zones does lead to significant reduction
of the AETR, which in turn successfully attract more foreign investment.
These findings have wide-ranging implications for policymakers in China as well
as in other developing countries. If the continued loss of farmland as a consequence
of expanding development zones is deemed undesirable by the national authorities,
there will be a need to rethink some other national policies, in particular providing
subnational governments with significant measures of tax autonomy through which
they may implement their competition policies. In all, some degree of competition
at the subnational level can be beneficial to help keep the public sector more
efficient. But at any rate, some degree of tax competition can be more
desirable—with less detrimental externalities—than competition through the
establishment of development zones and the accelerated loss of farmland. In fact,
there is some evidence that China’s experience of losing farmland for establishing
development zones has been repeated in some other developing countries of similar
institutional background. For instance, in a very recent policy announcement, the
Vietnamese government pulled the brake stopping any new development zones in
provinces and cities to avoid further inefficient land use and loss of farmland. In this
regard, this study provides broader insights and implications for other countries in
similar conditions.
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Appendix A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
A.1 Equilibrium Solution of the Model
The problem of region i is to choose the level of Ii independently so as to maximize
its objective function (15), subject to its budget constraint (17). The first order
condition (FOC) gives
(1− t+ λt+ λυit
pi∑
i pi
− λυit)(
∂Fi
∂Ki
∂Ki
∂Ii
+
∂Fi
∂Ii
) + λυit
pi∑
i pi
∑
j 6=i
∂Fj
∂Kj
∂Kj
∂Ii
= λ (28)
Given market clearing condition (14) and total stock of capital in the economy is
fixed
∑
iKi = K¯ , it is straightforward to find that
∂Fi
∂Ki
= r
1−t
, for all i and
∂Ki
∂Ii
= −
∑
j 6=i
∂Kj
∂Ii
. Substituting these two conditions, along with the capital
allocation rule Ki = (
1
r
(1− t)αAiI
β
i )
1
1−α and the aggregate production function (13)
into equation (28), I derive the decision rule for investments in public input as
Ii = (
1
λ
βAiK
α
i τi)
1
1−β (29)
Thereby, the capital allocation rule Ki = (
1
r
(1− t)αAiI
β
i )
1
1−α and the public
input decision rule (29) jointly characterize the equilibrium of the model. The
solution to these two equations system is presented in equations (18) and (19).
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A.2 Simulation of the MTRE in Germany
In this appendix, I provide a detailed description of the simulation method I
employed to calculate the MTRE for each state covering the period 1995-2007. My
method is similar to those of Baretti et al. (2002), Hauptmeier (2009), and Bttner
et al. (2011), but with a novel distinction that I include the case of the new system
arrangements which took effective from 2005 onward.80 The simulation is based on
the federal fiscal equalization rules (Finanzausgleichsgesetz- FAG) obtained from
the Bundesgesetzblatt, which have been described in section III.3 for the period
from 1995 to 2004 (known as “Solidarity Part I”) and will be specified in this
appendix for the period from 2005 to 2019 (known as “Solidarity Part II”).
Although the system arrangements before and after 2005 have been changed in
numerous aspects, the basic structure and mechanism have not been changed, and
the simulation processes, as you will see, are virtually the same.
To begin with, let us first define some notations that I will need.81 I denote tsi as
state i’s fiscal capacity (Finanzkraftmeßzahl) in stage s (s = 1, 2, 3) of the LFA
system.82 The state’s corresponding fiscal need (Ausgleichsmeßzahl) in stage s, nsi ,
is simply the per capita average of all the states’ fiscal capacity multiplied by the
state’s population pi. Algebraically, n
s
i =
∑
i t
s
i
P
pi, where P =
∑
i pi is the overall
population in the country. I further denote Zsj as total amount of transfers received
by state j (“receiving” state) that is eligible for receiving transfers from the system
in stage s. Csk denotes total amount of transfers contributed by state k
(“contributing” state) that is required for contributing transfers to the system in
state s.
80More specifically, the new system arrangements apply to the simulation for years 2005, 2006
and 2007 in this study.
81All notations represent values in one particular year.
82Note that tax revenues that are considered as states’ fiscal capacity vary across different stages
of the LFA system.
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I now turn to the discussion of how one unit increase of additional own source
tax revenue affects the transfer amounts received or contributed by state i in stage s.
A.2.1 Stage 1: VAT Redistribution
A.2.1.1 The Solidarity Part I (1995-2004)
As discussed in section III.3, in this stage, up to 25 percent of the state’s share of
total national VAT is reallocated to those states’ per capita fiscal capacity that is
less than 92 percent of the per capita average of all the states. Fiscal capacity
considered at this stage includes all pure state taxes plus a state’s share of corporate
income tax and personal income tax. Mathematically, total amount of transfers
received by the “receiving” states are
Z1j = 0.92n
1
j − t
1
j if t
1
j 6 0.92n
1
j (30)
To see how a marginal increase in tax revenues in state j affects the VAT
transfers received in this stage, I derive the first derivative of Z1j with respect to t
1
j
∂Z1j
∂t1j
= 0.92
pi
P
− 1 (31)
Since 0.92pi
P
< 1, this term is negative, indicating that an increase of fiscal
capacity in this stage reduces the transfers received from the system.
On the other hand, contributions from the “contributing” states are indirect in
this stage. An unit increase of own source tax revenue in “contributing” state k will
raise fiscal need in each state i by pi
P
, which makes initially “receiving” state j
eligible for additional VAT transfers from the system by 0.92
pj
P
. These additional
VAT transfers for all the “receiving” states in turn have to be financed by a
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reduction of the “residual VAT” revenues,83 which otherwise would be distributed
among all states including “contributing” state k. Therefore, the additional amounts
contributed by state k with one unit tax revenue increase can be denoted by
∂C1k
∂t1k
= (
J∑
j=1
0.92
pj
P
)
pk
P
(32)
where J represents the total number of “receiving” states in this stage.
A.2.1.2 The Solidarity Part II (2005-2019)
Following the new federal fiscal equalization rules (Finanzausgleichsgesetz- FAG),
total amount of VAT transfers received by “receiving” state j are summarized as
follows


Z1j = n
1
j [
19
20
X − 21
4000
] if t1j 6 0.97n
1
j ;
Z1j = n
1
j [X(
35
6
X + 3
5
)] if 0.97n1j < t
1
j 6 n
1
j .
(33)
where X = 1−
t1j
n1j
. The marginal effect of an increase in the fiscal capacity in state j
reads


∂Z1j
∂t1j
= 19
20
(
pj
P
− 1)− 21
4000
pj
P
if t1j 6 0.97n
1
j ;
∂Z1j
∂t1j
= (
pj
P
− 1)[35
6
X + 3
5
] + (n1j − t
1
j)
pj
P
t1j−n
1
j
(n1j )
2
35
6
if 0.97n1j < t
1
j 6 n
1
j .
(34)
Similarly, for the “contributing” states, an unit increase of own source tax
revenue in “contributing” state k will raise fiscal need in each state i by pi
P
, which
makes initially “receiving” state j eligible for additional VAT transfers from the
system by (19
20
pj
P
− 21
4000
pj
P
) if its fiscal capacity is less than 97 percent of its fiscal
83Note that if the total amount available for VAT redistribution is larger than what is needed, the
residuals are redistributed among all states according to the state’s population share. In my data,
for all years from 1995 to 2007, there were VAT residuals for additional distribution.
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need (t1j 6 0.97n
1
j).
84 Therefore, the additional amounts contributed by state k with
one unit tax revenue increase can be denoted by
∂C1k
∂t1k
= (
J∑
j=1
19
20
pj
P
−
21
4000
pj
P
)
pk
P
(35)
A.2.2 Stage 2: Fiscal Equalization among the States
A.2.2.1 The Solidarity Part I (1995-2004)
Fiscal capacity in this second stage is calculated as the sum of state tax revenues,
which includes total VAT revenues received in the first stage, and 50 percent (64
percent in the Solidarity Part II period) of the tax revenues of its municipalities. As
in stage 1, parameters used in this stage are specified in section III.3, and total
transfers received by “receiving” state j can be summarized as follows


Z2j = (0.92n
2
j − t
2
j) + (n
2
j − 0.92n
2
j)0.375 if t
2
j 6 0.92n
2
j ;
Z2j = (n
2
j − t
2
j)0.375 if 0.92n
2
j < t
2
j 6 n
2
j .
(36)
Differentiating with respect to fiscal capacity in state j yields


∂Z2j
∂t2j
= 0.95
pj
P
− 1 if t2j 6 0.92n
2
j ;
∂Z2j
∂t2j
= 0.375(
pj
P
− 1) if 0.92n2j < t
2
j 6 n
2
j .
(37)
For “contributing” state k, total transfers contributed by “contributing” state k can
be summarized as follows


C2k = (t
2
k − n
2
k)0.15 if n
2
k < t
2
k 6 1.01n
2
k;
C2k = (1.01n
2
k − n
2
k)0.15 + (t
2
k − 1.01n
2
k)0.66 if 1.01n
2
k < t
2
k 6 1.1n
2
k;
C2k = (1.01n
2
k − n
2
k)0.15 + (1.1n
2
k − 1.01n
2
k)0.66 + (t
2
k − 1.1n
2
k)0.8 if t
2
k > 1.1n
2
k.
(38)
84Since in my data, there is no state that having fiscal capacity in the rage of 0.97n1j < t
1
j 6 n
1
j ,
so we do not need to consider this case here.
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The marginal effect of an increase of fiscal capacity in state k reads


∂C2
k
∂t2
k
= (1− pk
P
)0.15 if n2k < t
2
k 6 1.01n
2
k;
∂C2
k
∂t2
k
= 0.66− 0.6651pk
P
if 1.01n2k < t
2
k 6 1.1n
2
k;
∂C2
k
∂t2
k
= 0.8− 0.8191pk
P
if t2k > 1.1n
2
k.
(39)
A.2.2.2 The Solidarity Part II (2005-2019)
As described in Figure 1, under the new system, total transfers received by
“receiving” state j and total transfers contributed by “contributing” state k in this
second stage are regulated by symmetric formulas specified as follows


D2i = n
2
i [
3
4
X1 −
317
20000
] if t2i 6 0.8n
2
i or t
2
i > 1.2n
2
i ;
D2i = n
2
i [X1(
5
26
X1 +
35
52
)− 2121
260000
] if 0.8n2i < t
2
i 6 0.93n
2
i or 1.07n
2
i < t
2
i 6 1.2n
2
i ;
D2i = n
2
iX1(
13
7
X1 +
11
25
) if 0.93n2i < t
2
i 6 n
2
i or n
2
i < t
2
i 6 1.07n
2
i .
(40)
where D2i = Z
2
j , n
2
i = n
2
j , and X1 = 1−
t2j
n2j
if t2i 6 n
2
i , while D
2
i = C
2
k , n
2
i = n
2
k and
X1 =
t2
k
n2
k
− 1 if t2i > n
2
i .
Taking the first derivative of D2i with respect to t
2
i yields


∂D2i
∂t2i
= 34X2 −
317
20000
pi
P
if t2i 6 0.8n
2
i or t
2
i > 1.2n
2
i ;
∂D2i
∂t2i
= X2(
5
26X1 +
35
52) + (n
2
i − t
2
i )(
t2i
pi
P
−n2i
(n2i )
2
5
26) if 0.8n
2
i < t
2
i 6 0.93n
2
i or 1.07n
2
i < t
2
i 6 1.2n
2
i ;
∂D2i
∂t2i
= X2(
13
7 X1 +
11
25) + (n
2
i − t
2
i )(
t2i
pi
P
−n2i
(n2i )
2
13
7 ) if 0.93n
2
i < t
2
i 6 n
2
i or n
2
i < t
2
i 6 1.07n
2
i .
(41)
where
∂D2i
∂t2i
=
∂Z2j
∂t2j
, n2i = n
2
j , t
2
i = t
2
j , X1 = 1−
t2j
n2j
, and X2 =
pj
P
− 1 if t2i 6 n
2
i , while
∂D2i
∂t2i
=
∂C2
k
∂t2
k
, n2i = n
2
k, t
2
i = t
2
k, X1 =
t2
k
n2
k
− 1, and X2 = 1−
pk
P
if t2i > n
2
i .
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A.2.3 Stage 3: Supplementary Federal Grants
In this stage, additional transfers are granted vertically from the federal government
to subsidize those states whose fiscal capacity is still below the national average
after stages one and two. The equalization formulas used in this stage are relatively
simple and only applied to the “receiving” states.
A.2.3.1 The Solidarity Part I (1995-2004)
Under the solidarity part I, any remaining gap between the “poor” states’ fiscal
capacity and fiscal need after stages 1 and 2 is closed up to 90 percent, formally
Z3j = 0.9(n
3
j − t
3
j) if t
3
j 6 n
3
j (42)
The corresponding marginal effect of an increase in fiscal capacity is given by
∂Z3j
∂t3j
= 0.9(
pj
P
− 1) if t3j 6 n
3
j (43)
A.2.3.2 The Solidarity Part II (2005-2019)
Under the new system, the difference between the “poor” states’ fiscal capacity and
99.5 percent of its fiscal need after stages 1 and 2 is equalized up to 77.5 percent,
mathematically
Z3j = 0.775(0.995n
3
j − t
3
j) if t
3
j 6 0.995n
3
j (44)
This gives the marginal effect of an increase in fiscal capacity as follows
∂Z3j
∂t3j
= 0.771
pj
P
− 0.775 if t3j 6 0.995n
3
j (45)
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A.2.4 Calculation of the Overall MTRE
In order to calculate the overall MTRE of a state in a particular year, I consider the
experiment that personal income tax revenue increases by one unit. Due to the tax
sharing mechanism I described in section III.3, 42.5% of personal income tax
revenue accrues to the federal government, while the rests are allocated between
state and municipality governments at a rate of 42.5% and 15% respectively. Thus
the MTRE is at least 0.425 for the portion goes to the federal government. Then
the LFA system comes into effect for the rest 0.575 unit increment of income tax:
since during stage 1 only pure state taxes and a state’s share of corporate income
tax and personal income tax are taken into account as fiscal capacity, so stage 1
increases the MTRE by 0.425|
∂Z1j
∂t1j
| and 0.425
∂C1
k
∂t1
k
for the “receiving” states and the
“contributing” states respectively; during stage 2, 50% of the tax revenues of its
municipalities is also included in the calculation of fiscal capacity, so stage 2
increases the MTRE by (0.425 ∗ (1− |
∂Z1j
∂t1j
|) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ |
∂Z2j
∂t2j
| and
(0.425 ∗ (1−
∂C1
k
∂t1
k
) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗
∂C2
k
∂t2
k
for the “receiving” states and the
“contributing” states respectively; finally, stage 3 increases the MTRE by
(0.425 ∗ (1− |
∂Z1j
∂t1j
|) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ (1− |
∂Z2j
∂t2j
|) ∗ |
∂Z3j
∂t3j
| for the “receiving” states. In
sum, the overall MTRE for each state can be presented as follows
MTRE =


For the “receiving” states:
0.425 + 0.425|
∂Z1j
∂t1j
|+ (0.425 ∗ (1− |
∂Z1j
∂t1j
|) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ |
∂Z2j
∂t2j
|+
(0.425 ∗ (1− |
∂Z1j
∂t1j
|) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ (1− |
∂Z2j
∂t2j
|) ∗ |
∂Z3j
∂t3j
|
For the “contributing” states:
0.425 + 0.425
∂C1
k
∂t1
k
+ (0.425 ∗ (1−
∂C1
k
∂t1
k
) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗
∂C2
k
∂t2
k
(46)
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